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Introduction 
In American copyright law. the doctrine of ""fair use" has long been problematic. 
Every plausible litmus test that might simplify the "fair use"' inquiry has proven 
inadequate. 1 and copyright commentators have long sought an algorithm or 
* Copyright 2002 hy Wendy J. Gordon. For helpful comments I am grateful to workshop participants 
at the American LI\\" & Economics Association. the Society for Economic Research on Copyright 
Issues. the Uni\-ersity of Arizona. the Australian National University Faculty of Law. the Boston 
Lniversity Faculty Workshop and the B.U. Intellectual Property Discussion Group. the Uni\·ersity 
of California (Berkeley) the Cardom School of Law Conference on Copyright Law as Com-
munications Policy. the Cardozo-DePaul First Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference (at 
DePaul). the Copyright Society of Australia (Sydney). the University of Montreal. St. Catherine\ 
College in the CniYersitv of Oxford (U.K.). the UniYersity of Sydney and. of course. the Conference 
on the Commodificatio~ of Information at the University of Haifa (Israel). In particular I thank Ed 
Baker. Linda Bui. Tyler Cowen. Tamar Frankel. Mike Harper. Gary Lawson. Mark Lemley. David 
Lyons. Mike Meurer. Neil Netanel. David Nimmer. Richard Posner. Margaret Jane Radin. Megan 
Richardson. Anne Seidman. Bob Seidman. Seana Shiffrin. Ken Simons. Avishalom Tor. Da\·id 
V;m:r and the members of mv seminar in intellectual propert\· theorv. Ahle students Michael 
Burling. Peter Cancclmo and Alisa Hacker provided research as~istance: 
A court \\ill deem a defendant"s copying or other use of the plaintiffs work ·•fair" when. hy and 
large. the use is non-commercial. i1wolves a quantitatively small amount of copying. serves the 
public interest. and causes little or no harm to the owner of the copyright. See 17 U .S.C. section 
107. Yet there are cases that gin: the lie to each of these factors standing alone: Cases where 
"fair use" \\as found potentially m·ailable for a use that is commercial. Camphell r. Arnf(Row 
Jlusic. 510 U.S. 569. 585 ( 1994): for a use that copies 100 percent of the copyrighted work. 
II "illia111s & II "ilk i11.1 ( ·o. r. l ".S .. 20J Ct. Cl. N. 89 90 ( 1973 ! • af/"'d hy an c't/llalh dirided cour/. 
420 U.S. :076 ( 1975) (per curiam): for a use of trivial aesthetic or public importance. Sony Corp. 
o( A111aica l". l "11ir<'1".1al Cill" Srllllios. Inc .. 464 U.S. 417. 440 ( 1983) (Cllp)ing of. inrer alia. 
tclc\·ision entertainment programs): and for a use that harmfully diminishes the demand for the 
copyrighted work. d Fisher v. Dees. 794 F.2d 432. 437 38 (9th Cir. 1986) (for fair use 
purposes. only substitutional harm is relernnt: other kinds of harm do not weigh against fair 
iV. Elki11-l\or('11 and .V.11" . . \'erancl r £'ti.I".!. The Co111111odif/('{lfio11 of !11fiwmario11. 149 192. 
1 2002 11 ·em/r .I. (iordo11. l'rilll<'d i11 Grear Bri1ai11. 
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heuristic to lend predictability and conceptual coherence to the doctrine. In an 
article whose recommendations are now sometimes misapplied, I suggested that 
the key to understanding the protean forms of "fair use" could best be found in 
the notion of market failure. 2 In the instant essay I extend and refine my market 
failure analysis in a way that should clarify its implications. 
First, I here suggest that fair use cases can be usefully separated into two 
categories of market failure, which I dub "market malfunction" and "inherent 
limitation". Briefly, "market malfunction" identifies instances where there is a 
failure of perfect market conditions, but where economic norms appropriately 
govern. This is the category most law and economics scholars mean by '"market 
failure". However, there is an additional set of circumstances where we cannot rely 
on markets to function as socially satisfactory institutions for the distribution of 
resources. These are the many instances where market norms themselves fail to 
provide fully suitable criteria for resolving a dispute. This kind of market failure I 
call "inherent market limitation". As will appear below. policies regarding 
commodification can help us distinguish when a court should treat a given 
interaction as appropriately governed by market norms, and when instead the 
court should treat such norms as fully or partly inadequate. 
Second, I suggest that the distinction between these kinds of market failure can 
be illuminated by drawing on the distinction between "excuse" and "justification". 
That distinction. so far best developed in the context of criminal law, is capable of 
more general application. 
"Excuse" connotes "if only" - if" on/v some discrete fact were different, we 
could apply the law as written. In in~tanc~s of "market malfunction" we are in the 
rnnt. 
useJ. S_imilarly. when the Supreme Court put great stress on the unpublished nature of a 
plamlltrs work. Ha_rper & Row. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). Congress fairly quickly passed an 
amendment to the fau use statute to clarify that the unpublished status of a work should not be 
, detcrmmallve. See the last sentence of 17 U.S.C. section 107 
- Wendy 1. Gordon. Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structu;al and Economic A11alrsis of the 
Bctamax Case a11d its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982) (hereinafter "Fair Use as Market Failure".) 
. Tl1t: ~ypic;'.I 1~i~un~erstanding has been to interpret me as arguing that "the impossibility of 
.irmmg .it b,i.rgams [1s] the essenllal JUslification for the doctrine of fair use." David Lmdsay. 
The F11111re of the Fair Dea/i11 D r. c · · · N l" 
, . . · g e,ense to oprnght /11fr111ge111ent at 62 (Research Paper o -· Universnv of Melb C " · · · 
· , ourne entre 1or Media, Communications and Information Technology 
Law. November 1 000)· accord Rob 1 p M .,.., . R. I A11tl 
. . , '.. - · . .. · er . erges, , rle End of Frictio11:' Property 1g lls ~Ion;~~(; 1~ Tiu Neirto11 u111 World Of' On-line Commerce, l:i Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115 at 130-
- . ( . ). 0 the c.ontrary. of course. the impossibility of arriving at bargains is only one of the 
I) pes of market failure I exp! d · v · " r ·1 
.. . . . . . . ore m rair use as Market Failure. Other types of market 1al ure c.:,m ,mse. mter aha m the pres f . . . . -, . 
. . . · . . ence o nonmonet1zable mterests, anti-dissemmallon moll\es. 
and pos11lve externaht1es generated by users. See id. at l 6~0-15 
Nevertheless Lydia Palla· L - - · h· 
. k 1 ' s oren suggests that many courts as well as some scholars ave t,1 en t 1e erroneously narrow · . f h . /' · 
I , 'f ·'· . viev. 0 I e market failure defense. Lydia Pallas Loren, Rede ming I " ,, m 'el Fwlure Approach r, F. · u. · I t I 
Prop. L. I. 26---27 1997 1 . 0 • al/' se 111 an Eraof' Copyri[?ht Permi.1·.1·ion Sy.1·1c111s. 5 l n e · 
. . 1 1- h · ( ). applaud most of the discussion in the Loren ·1rticlc as helping to 
,ner urt er m1sunderstandi . d h . ' . 
ng. an ope that the instant essay will help clarify further. 
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world of "'if only"': we would prefer the market to govern if only the market could 
function well, but when it fails to do so (because of. e.g .. transaction costs). a court 
may excuse a participant from adhering to the usual market rules. Therefore, the 
"market malfunction" category corresponds. in a loose but useful way. to the legal 
concept of "excuse"'. It is based on the nonappearance of conditions that the 
governing model views as normal.3 and is thus a conditional defense. 
By contrast, a defense of ··inherent limitation"' would not be conditional in this 
way. If market norms are inherently inadequate in the particular context. then 
even were the market to function perfectly. a court might approve a departure 
from market procedures as justified under these other norms. Thus I suggest that 
this second category of market failure is analogous to the established concept of 
"justification". When we come up against the market's inherent limitations. we 
don't yearn toward what the market could do "if only·· some fact were changed. 
We turn to other norms. 
(Note the distinction parallels criminal law only in part. Criminal law parses 
''excuse" as pertaining largely to state of mind, and "justification" largely to a 
defendant's act. The way I use the terms, the core of the distinction is seen more 
generally: "Excuse"' is a matter of factual divergence from the standard: 
"justification" is a matter of norms: and acts can be justified or excused.) 
Third, I point out that in all tort cases - and copyright infringement is no 
exception - excuse and justification can apply at any of three levels: to the 
defendant's behal'ior. to the defendant's failure to obtain the plaintiffs permission, 
and;or to the defendant's failure to compensate. (This. too, is different from criminal 
law.) I show how the single "fair use" inquiry in fact contains all three inquiries. 
Fourth. I suggest that courts should and do treat cases where a lack of 
permission and compensation are excused (market malfunction) differently from 
cases where absence of permission and compensation are justified (market 
limitation). The difference in treatment is summarized at the end of this 
Introduction. 
Finally. I argue that significant societal dangers lurk in responding to 
defendants' claims of fair use with judicially created compulsory licenses. This 
latter option - denying the plaintiff an injunction but making the defendant pay · 
may look like a wonderful compromise that satisfies both free speech and incentive 
concerns. but data from psychology and behavioral law and economics suggests 
that it has costs of its own. 
* * * 
-' Admittedly. the market is ne\'er fully '"perfect'". What counts as market malfunction is a matter 
of degree. This too bears a good analogy to the criminal law treatment of ""excuse··. The owrall 
criminal law model assumes persons are rational actors who respond to incentives such as fear 
of imprisonment. even though all people arc sometimes irrational and sometimes immune from 
incentives. It is onlv when the divergence from the normal grows great enough that someone is 
declared '"insane··. ·that he may be ~xcused for criminal acts he performs. 
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My earlier work, linking fair use generally to notions of marke_t f~ilure, ~s 
consistent with making the proffered distinction between excused and Justified fau 
uses:' Where I diverge from my earlier writing, however, is in my current belief 
that not all cases of market failure should be treated alike. Most notably, in my 
earlier work I had argued that even in the presence of market failure, fair use 
should generally be denied if recognizing the defense would cause substantial 
injury to the copyright owner.5 I now recognize that condition as overly 
restrictive. 6 Substantial injury to the plaintiff is a factor that should be treated 
differently by "excuse" cases and by "justification" cases. 
I will here argue as follows: 
I. A case of "justification .. can occur when we would not object if others emulated 
a defendant's having no permission and/or her having paid no compensation.7 
For free speech purposes, for example, it appears actively undesirable to 
require an iconoclast to obtain the permission of the entity she is ridiculing. 
We would want iconoclasts like her to speaks without obtaining permission 
from their targets.9 If so, the iconoclast's failure to ask permission is justified. 10 
.i As mentioned. in Fair l"se as Markel Failure, supra note 2. I presented "nonmonetizable 
interests"' as a form of market failure. Id. at 1630. As discussed below. the presence of 
nonmonetizahle interests can constitute a "justification"' for fair use. In Fair [,'se as Markel 
foi/11re I argued that transaction costs high enough to impede bargaining constituted another 
form of market failure. Id. at 1628. As discussed below. the presence of high transaction costs 
between owner and user can constitute an ··excuse" for a court providing fair use treatment. 
Thus the use of the "excuse" and "'justification" categories refines but does not contradict my 
, e'.1rlierddinition of the market failures that can trigger fair use treatment. 
,, fem l ·'."as :\111rke1 Failure. supra note::! at 1618-27 and passim. 
One of the 1111portant influences stimulating me to rethink this issue was Neil W. Netanel. 
Coprrigh~ and a Democralic Ciril Sociely. 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996) at 330-331. I thank Neil 
, Nctanel Im the excellent and helpful criticism. 
~c1d1 ~- Hurd. Prop1er Honoris Respeaum: Ju.11ificatio11 and Exrnse, Wrongdoin~ and 
< ulpahih!Y· 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1551, 1555 (1999) ('"A ... well-known test of when actions 
arc .1uslll1t:d hol.ds th~t an action is justified if and only if we are willing to recommend that 
others emulate 11 m smular circumstances. In contrast, an action is eligible only for an excuse 
when. we '~·ish that the actor had acted differently and hope that others do not emulate the 
. ach>r s unfortunate conduct in the future") 
' 
1 am followin¥ the convention that uses '"speech" to embrace all acts of communication. ~c\·er_thcless .. tor th.ose w?o i~entify .. speech" with .. talking", please note that quoting from Cl~P}~i.ghted wo:k~ m ones pnv.ate talk does not require permission under copyright law. no 
1:\•111,ei ho\\ ~xki~~l\e the quotation may ~e: That is because ··private performance" is outs.ide _a 
Cl P}nght 01' ner ~control. By contrast. g1vmg a public talk is a .. public performance" which is 
,, governed by sectwn_ 106 of the Copyright Act. J 7 U.S.C. section 106(4). 
Should the law reqUJre the icon I· t t b · · · h · · 
. . oc as o o tam the perm1ss1on of the person whose oeuvre s e is 
attack111g. such a requirement · Id 1·k I bl · · · · d 
t•1. . " \\OU t e Y ock the cnt1que altogether or blunt its pomt an e cctlveness. The target's disl'k f b · · ' · ·1 · 
. . .1 b . . . . . . . 1 e 0 emg attacked 1s not a technical problem that can he eas1 } 
111 """ } tweaking mst1tut1ons or technology. 
Issues can anse on the borderli b t " · F 
I . . . ne e ween excuse and Justification ·1s will appear below. or one examp e. consider policies f d" 'b · ' ' · Id 
b I , . . 0 re istn ut10n. One scholar arguing tint redistribution shou e a re evant 1a1r use pohcy · R b M ' · Id 
· · 
15 0 ert erges, supra note 'l ·1t I '1- '6 Cti11•·c1·v·1hly this cou 0 1ve nse to an '"excus .. · h . ~ ' -'· -' · ~ ' . · 
"" · .e ·mt e sense that correcting the maldistrihution might eliminate the lair 
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2. For fair use. a potential '"excuse" arises when something occurs that we do 1101 
want to have emulated - a behavior. lack of permission. or lack of 
compensation - but which we allow without imposing liability because of 
the particular facts of that case. A paradigmatic example is presented when 
high transaction costs between owner and possible licensee are so large that 
they swamp any possibility of bargaining. 11 The social good that could be 
furthered by the blocked transaction, coupled with the incapacity of the 
participants to use the market, can "excuse" the defendant from going 
forward without asking permission. 12 But if transaction costs were lower. we 
would want the defendant's use to occur only if voluntarily licensed by the 
copyright owner. 
3. In cases of '"excuse". fair use should and does disappear if. because of 
institutional or technological change. the excusing circumstances disappear. 
By contrast. in cases of ··justification" a change in circumstances would not 
change the availability of the fair use defense. 13 
4. In cases of '"excuse". it is defensible to deny fair use treatment if it would do 
significant harm to the plaintiffs interests and to the incentives of similarly 
situated copyright owners. Jn cases of ··justification". however. harm to the 
owner should be given much more limited importance. 14 
The instant essay will explain the relevant concepts, explore the logical 
connections between them. and provide some examples. In addition, it will use 
concepts of both excuse and justification to explore a problem area that straddles 
the distinction: attempts by copyright owners to use intellectual property law as a 
tool of private censorship. 
I begin by offering a partial conceptual map of excuse and justification. 
CO/I/. 
use. Alternatively. this could be conceptualized as a case of justification. where the market\ 
monetary measure will be unable to accomplish social ends. 
11 The importance of transaction costs depends on their size relatil'e to the benefits to be reaped 
from a transaction. A potential license will likely be blocked whenever the copyright owner and 
putative copier face transaction costs that are higher than any net gains that could result from a 
consummated transaction. See Fair L'se as Market Failure. supra note 2 at 1617-30. 
le This is how I interpret the court's decision in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S.. 203 Ct. Cl. 74 
(1973). afT'd hy an equallr dil'ided court. 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam). See Fair Use as 
,Harket Failure. supra note 2. 
1.i The only thing that would change the availability of the defense in cases of justification is a 
change in 11or1111· 
14 Pleas~ note that. ~oint (3 ). regarding change in circumstance. is true of all ··excuses·· by definition. 
An excuse is a defense based on special circumstances. which is applicable only when the 
circumstances are present. The next factor discussed - point (4). substantial injury to the copyright 
owner - is not definitional in the same way. and applies to many but not all cases of excuse. 
Presenting a full development would be beyond the scope of this summary. The article's 
purpose is to show the connections between fair use. ··justification"". and commodilication. 
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Excuse and justification 
In common lawyer's parlance, an act or omission is said to be ""justified" if we 
would not object to its being emulated. 15 An act or omission is said to be 
"excused" if we would not want it to be emulated, but we have reasons other than 
the merits of the act or omission itself to relieve the defendant of liability. Thus, 
one might say that "justifying" an act or omission goes to the merits of the 
defendant's choice, while giving the defendant an "excuse" does not go to the 
merits. 16 Usually, an "excuse" arises because of some kind of institutional lack of 
fit between the circumstances and what the applicable law seeks to accomplish. 
To illustrate. consider self-defense in the ordinary common law of crime. If 
someone in using reasonable force to repel a violent attack unavoidably breaks her 
attacker's arm, the attacker will not be able to sue the arm-breaker successfully for 
battery, nor will the arm-breaker be criminally liable. Her acts will not give rise to 
liability because it is desirable for innocent parties to defend themselves. The use of 
reasonable force is proper, and what the arm-breaker has done is justified. Even if 
it is not the best thing that she could have done (we may have preferred her to run 
away). the action is morally acceptable. We would not object to its being emulated 
by persons similarly situated. 
By contrast, consider an arm-breaker who was delusional in thinking she was 
being attacked. In a criminal trial, she might escape conviction for battery. but not 
because her actions were justified. Rather, the delusional arm-breaker might be 
found "not guilty by reason of insanity". Such a verdict reflects an excuse. We do 
not want her action emulated. Rather, the criminal law merely chooses not to 
impose a criminal sanction because of particular circumstances that cause a lack of 
fit between the defendant's state of mind, on the one hand, and. on the other, the 
purposes and functioning of criminal law and its sanctions. A different result 
1; ~ee ~urd: si'.pra note 7. Or. as stated in the classic treatment by H.L.A. Hart: '"In the case of 
JUsllticall?.n what is done is regarded as something which the law does not condemn. or even 
welcomes. H.L.A. Hart. Pro/egomenon to the Principles of' Punishment. in PUNISHMENT 
A:ND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 13 (Oxford 1968) (lootnote ommed). 
16 For.this useful s!mplification. I am indebted to Tamar Frankel. It allows me to sidestep the 
fascmatmg quest10n of wh th h · · .. 
h. . e er t ere is some definable essence other th·111 ··not on the ments. t at motivates excuses in civ1·1 tort Ia A ·11 · · ' .. · the tort 0 · . w. s w1 appear below. I argue that most "excuses m 
I _. ··bfl copyright are hnked to deviations from what would be needed for the neoclassical 
m1S1 e Hand to operate But a th. · · · h · 1· I 
I . . . . · s IS mtu1t1on as a great deal of openness a sidestep 1s use u · 
n cnmmal law. It 1s often d th· ... · · .. · · h'I 
.. .. argue at JUsllficat10n goes to the defendant s m·t. w 1 e 
excuse goes to the defendant' I b·1· I' 14 (.. h I · 1 s cu pa 11ty as a person S'ee H·1rt 1·1111rc1 note 15 at -' -psyc o og1ca st t f th .. · · · ' · · 
. a e 0 e agent ); cf George Fletcher. RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 
at 577-78. 734andchapter IO(L'ttl 8 .... 
· tt ·b · ) I 1 e, rown & Co. 1978) (excuse ·1s I·ll:k of '"1ccountah1hty or a n ullon . n my schema th . f f . · ' · ' ' . 
be excused as well as justifled~ acts 0 re usmg to pay. or of refusing to seek eompensa11011. can 
154 
EXCUSE AND JUSTIFICATION IN THE LAW OF FAIR USE 
might well be reached by a judge applying the civil law of torts, 17 with its different 
purposes and function. 
If one evaluates the purposes and function of copyright, what do we find? 
Copyright sets up a market system in which, it is hoped, copyright owners, 
publishers, new creators and consumers will enter into transactions which will 
both disseminate the creative works and provide incentives for their creation.1 8 
Ownership is given to the class of persons - creators - from whose hands a market 
will most easily evolve and which will result in a desirable degree of 
internalization. 19 It is hoped that the result will maximize social welfare as well 
as the welfare of the participants. (Of the many ways to measure welfare, most 
legal scholars follow Judge Posner's classic approach, and seek to "maximize value 
17 Many states whose criminal law might excuse the delusional defendant would nevertheless 
impose civil (tort) liability on her. 
Ix This standard language of ··incentive and dissemination'" is sometimes misinterpreted. 
Copyright is granted as a monopoly to subsidize creativity and not as a monopoly to subsidize 
physical production or physical dissemination. This was true historically as well. The publishers 
who benefited under the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne. were those who had paid 
authors for an exclusive right to copy. Statute of Anne. 1710. 8 Anne. ch. 19. Thus. although 
publisher pressure may have helped that first copyright act come into being. the publishers were 
not subsidized as publishers. but rather as persons who had supported the authorial entt:rprise. 
Had the publishers not paid for copyrights. their mere physical costs of printing and 
distribution would not have supported a claim for governmental aid. Normal competition 
applies to those physical processes. Copyright docs not aim to make the physical act of 
dissemination more profitable than other physical processes. Copyright merely aims to 
encourage the creation of works - and the fixed costs of creation having been met. authors can 
then license the newlv made works. providing access to the public. 
19 Even if it is decided that the law should adopt a rule of deference to property owners. it still 
remains necessary to specify who is the owner. Who will rl!ceire an ab initio right to use the 
resource. as compared with the non-owning people who must purchase a privilege to use the 
resource? From a moral perspective. we might want authors and inventors to have initial 
ownership in their intangibles if they deserre ownership. Debate would then center on the 
proper nature and bases of desert. It would be in part empirical (who does what'?). but mostly 
normative (what significance should be given to what is done?). From a neoclassical economic 
perspective. however. ownership is placed not where it is morally deserved. but instead where 
benefits and costs can best be internalized. Debate then would center on how the dynamics of 
human behavior would be affected by different starting points. For example. if authors and 
inventors are given initial ownership rights. what is likely to follow'' Or if the public is given 
rights to copy. what is likely to follow'? 
For economic purposes. ownership should be allocated according to whatever starting point 
is most likely to internalize benefits in a way that will give adequate incentives to produce 
socially-valuable products without causing excessive deadweight loss and administrative 
burdens. This involves essentially empirical inquiry. but some armchair inferences can be drawn 
from general patterns of human behavior. Thus. I have argued elsewhere that intellectual 
property markets and consequent internalization evolve most easily when. inter alia. copiers 
haw an incenti\·e to identify themselves. If so. giving ownership to the author or inventor 
indeed makes more economic sense than privileging all copiers. Conversely. I have argued that 
in most instances giving the public an entitlement to copy would be a cumbersome starting 
point. causing immense problems of coordination from which to reach a socially desirable level 
of production. If so. a starting point that presumptively gives ownership to authors and 
inventors. rather than to the public. appears preferable. Wendy J. Gordon. 0( Harm ancl 
Benefits: Torts. Restitution, and lntc/lecfllal Properly. 21 J. Legal Studies 449 (1992). 
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as measured by willingness to pay."20) Market transactions are thought a desirable 
way to pursue such maximization because, inter alia, decentralized market actors 
such as buyers and sellers have incentives to reveal some of their preferences, and 
need less data than a centralized entity would need in order to operate effectively. 
Second-guessing individual owners has high dangers of inaccuracy, as well as 
being administratively expensive.21 Thus, enforcing a market system is one of the 
best ways of being sure that efficiency will be achieved. assuming of course that 
transaction costs are low and other conditions of perfect competition are 
adequately met. Thus, in cases where economic value is at stake. we ordinarily 
1rn111 a potential user to seek permission from the copyright owner and pay a price 
they negotiate. A copyist who fails to obtain consent and to pay is considered an 
infringer. 
Sometimes, however, the goals of the law cannot be achieved through the 
market. If so. market logic suggests this is a good occasion for a defense: a 
doctrine or rule that permits the defendant to act without obtaining permission or 
paying compensation.22 The market perspective can be used not only to identify 
the occasion when a defense may be needed to achieve social goals. but can also 
help classify the possible defenses into excuses and justifications, as follows: 
20 The instant article takes as its target model the classic Posnerian approach of "maximizing 
wealth as me·1sured bv· "'1·11· ·· F 
.· . . · .' . " mgness to pay.. or an approach less used hy lawyers hut more 
si.mil<1r t~ th,11 used by academic economists. see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell. Fairness 
I enm IJ·e/far• 114 Ha L R 961 20 
• .' : • · 1 • .rv. · ev. ( 01 ). As Kaplow and Shavell point out. Judge Posner 
21 has h1ms~lf amend.ed his stance. Id. at note 68. 
Tim sect10n 1s obviously indebted t th · J · · G · · I d o e ana ys1s m uido Calahres1 and A. Douglas Me ame · 
ii;~~'~{~7~;'.tes. Liahility Rules. and lnalienahility: One Vieu· o{ the Cmhedra/. 85 ~Harv. L. Rev. 
22 A system of private law that puts th · · · · · 1· 
. k .. , .. . . e max1m1zat1on of economic value above the mamtenance o 
m<1r et 1orms will find either an . · · · · · · · · 
. . h . excuse or a JUsllficat10n - or ·1 pnm·1 f-tc1e hm1tat1on on 
owners ng ts - m all tho 't · t' h ' ' ' · 
.. t"t'· ·t . . . se SI ua wns w ere markets cannot he relied on to function as socially 
s,1 is .1c orv mstttuttons for the d' t ·b · f . . . 
Af , . 11 : . is n utton o resources. This statement 1s a virtual tautology. kr a · a svstem that aims at valu · · · . • 
. . · , e max1m1zat1on by usmg markets will have to hnd some 
me.ms to trans1er resources oth ti th h . ., 
. I · . h b er um roug owners voluntary consent when that economic go.i 1s unreac a le through markets. 
Despite the tautology the "m k [ .1 ,. . provides a checklist and~ struct ar et . ai ure language is useful: the economic paradigm 
which the usual mark t-b· d ure for mquiry. It helps us identify many of the oceas1ons on 
social value. e ase system, where the owner's will is law. will not reliably max11111zc 
Note. incidentally, that the instant . . . . . 
sake because e g th .b argument must alter 1f markets are desired for their mill 
· · ·· ey contn ute to an • · . that markets are desired b . f . owners autonomy. The instant analysis will assume 
exploration of alternat' ecause 0 their abihty to contribute to value-maximi1ation. For an 
. 1ve norms, see Ralph s B Et· .1 .1. . . . · · 4 Search for Principl,,dSt l l 70 . · rown. · 1g1111/r for ( 11p1·n~ht !'rotcct1011. ' 
. . • wuans. Mmn L R 57 . . . . t· 6 (copynght should serv th · · ev: 9 (1985). Also see. e.g .. Netanel. s11p1 a no c 
e e norm of encouragin d · · · . g emocrat1c cl\'ll soe1ety). 
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EXCUSE 
Sometimes the law's goal is economic. but a market malfunction is present in the 
sense that the current conditions diverge strongly from those needed for perfect 
competition. For example. high transaction costs may make it impractical for 
plaintiff and defendant to deal with each other. In such a case. allowing the 
defendant to proceed with his copying may produce a higher level of value than 
enforcing the copyright by enjoining the use. In such a case a court might allow a 
defendant fair use. 23 
However. allowing free use in such cases is distinctly a second-best solution. 
Recall that a criminal court might excuse an insane defendant. but 1rm11 him to 
have acted differently. Similarly. a copyright court in the presence of high 
transaction costs might cxrnsc the defendant, but if the transaction-cost problem 
were eliminated. would 11·a111 the defendant to proceed through the market. This 
notion of "we would prefer otherwise· is near the essence of excuse. 
JUSTIFICA TIO/\ 
Sometimes. by contrast. going outside the market is a first-best solution. In 
particular, where non-economic values are at stake. we might feel very uneasy 
trusting that market transactions could achieve the desired goals. In such a case, a 
judge might well decide that a defendant could be justified in proceeding without 
consent or compensation: that even if market conditions were perfect. it would be 
normatively appropriate to proceed outside the market's ordinary process of 
consent and payment. 
For example. we might 11·t111l a biographer to be able to quote from his subject's 
letters without obtaining the subject's consent. Similarly. we might 11·a111 someone 
who is exposing the foibles of another"s work to be able to quote from it without 
paying that other author compensation for the decrease in consumer demand that 
might follow. There can even be cases of copyright self-defense. where someone 
photocopies an attack that another wrote in order to refute it. 24 Under many views 
of fairness, we would not 11·a11t the photocopier to pay his attacker or be subject to 
the attacker"s veto power. 
In such a case. because the inherent limitations of the market prevent it from 
implementing desired values. justification may appear. In these cases. the lack of 
permission or compensation may indeed be something we would want emulated. 
,, 
-- See Fair Cse as .Harke! Failure, supra note 2. 
c4 Ct: Hustler Magazine Inc.\'. Moral Majority Inc.. 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986). discussed i11fi·a 
at notes 69 73 and accnmpanying text. 
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Three tiers of inquiry 
I argue that potentially tortious acts contain at least three components that must 
be assessed in terms of both excuse and justification. These components are ( 1) the 
defendant's ultimate hehai·ior in the world, that is, the defendant's use of the 
affected party's resource, (2) the defendant not having asked the affected party for 
her mnsent, and (3) the defendant not paying compensation to the affected party. 
Excuse and justification can go to any one level of inquiry, or all three. In_ order to 
make best use of the distinction between excuse and justification, we need to 
examine irhat is being excused or justified. 
Although it is not generally stated in precisely this fashion, 25 all torts embody 
these three different levels of possible limitation. The tort of copyright 
infringement is no different. Consider the following examples. drawn both from 
common law and copyright, which illustrate the three tiers of inquiry. Note that 
the answers to any of the three-tier inquiries can be expressed either in terms of 
defenses. or in terms of limitations on the plaintiffs initial right of action. 
BEHAVIOR 
ls the defendant's behavior desirable and/or excused? Learned Hand's negligence 
calculus reflects this kind of inquiry. Ifit is economically more efficient to neglect a 
precaution than to take it. negligence law imposes no liability on the defendant 
who fails to take the precaution. The privilege of self-defense also reflects this 
inquiry: it is desirable for persons to preserve themselves from attack. In copyright 
law. the desirability of the defendant's behavior - the use she makes of the 
plaintiffs copyrighted work - also plays an obvious role.26 One illustration is the 
~' Tl~e classic treatment is C~labresi and Melamed, supra note 21. They distinguish between rules 
tl1.1t protect a ngh.t-h?~der s veto (a "property rule") and rules that give him onlv a right to be 
compensated (a "hab1hty rule"). Id. at 1092. They also discuss how the law mighi decide where 
"' t~1 place an entitlement m the first instance. Id. at 1096-1106. 
hur ~se is.an a.rea that breaks or bends the usual copyright rules. For example. in the ordinary 
case. 1ud1c1al diffidence 1s the r 1 t d b H 1 · · · d t 
, .. : , . . . . u e, se .own y o mes: Judges arc supposedly 111 equ1ppe 0 ~i,ilu,ltc art. Bleistem v .. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239. 251-52 (1903). Some c~~rts tak~ .this.as an md1cator they. should not inquire into the social value of the works before 
t em. In fair use. however. the social value of the d r d· ·. . ·. 1· k, Similarlv i 1 f- · . . e1en ants use 1s o ten cy. . 
I h : · 1 ,ur use cases the usual rule that "creativity is no defense" is turned on its head. 
n t e ordmarv case where the d fi d· t h· bl' · · .. k 
.·th 1 · ·.IT'· . . e en an as pu 1shed a work that translorms plamt1ffs wor \\I out p amt1 s pernuss1on th d ti d • . . . . . 1 
. k . h. . . · e e en ant s creat1VIty 1s no defense: his creat1v1ty mere Y 
ma es 1s product an mfrmgin "d · . · .. · " 
I. ., . . . g enva11ve work . Further. as Learned Hand said. no P ag1.1mt can excuse the wrong by h · h . . . .. & 
Row 471 us . t 565 . s owmg ow much ofh1s work he did not pirate. Harper 
(,nd · ci·r ·19·3a6) - (quo~mg Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corporation, 81 F.2d 49. 56 
- · · . cert. llemed '98 US 669 193 · · t f t · ·1· · . · - · · ( 6)). Yet creat1v1ty ·md the exten o rans ormat1on are often key m fair use cases. ' 
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classic Time v. Geis case where an author was permitted fair use of copyrighted 
films showing the Kennedy assassination. The defendant had copied the films to 
illustrate a publicly valuable argument contesting the conclusions of the Warren 
Commission, and the court in granting fair use stressed the value of the 
defendant's behavior. n 
LACK OF PERMISSION 
If the defendant has not sought the property owner's permission. is that lack of 
deference to the plaintiffs property interest socially desirable and/or excused'? 
Again negligence law and self-defense provide useful illustrations. When an 
injury is unintentional, as in negligence law, no blame attaches for failing to 
obtain advance permission from the injured party. That person's identity was not 
knowable in advance. In order to state a prima facie case in negligence, therefore, 
plaintiff must show something more than he suffered an unconsented injury.2X 
As for self-defense, if we focus on the person who initiated the attack, we think 
the attacker through his aggression against another has (within reason) forfeited 
his ordinary right to be consulted about what happens to his body. In copyright's 
fair use doctrine, too, a copyright owner can forfeit his normative right to be 
consulted. This was intimated by the Supreme Court in Acuff Rose: since a 
copyright owner will not ordinarily license someone to lampoon him, a parodist 
may be justified in not seeking the owner's permission.29 
LACK OF COMPENSATION 
When the defendant has taken, used, invaded or injured something belonging to 
the property owner, is it justifiable or excusable that he not pay compensation for 
it'? In the famous case of Vincent v Lake Erie, a boat owner acted desirably in 
keeping his ship tied to the dock during a roaring storm, but the court nevertheless 
27 Time. Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130. 145-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding ··a 
public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of President 
Kennedy"). As will appear below, however, virtually all uses of intangibles are justified. The 
harder questions are whether a lack of compensation and, or permission can be excused or 
justified. 
28 My "'permission" category follows Calabresi & Melamed fairly closely. See their Property Rules. 
supra note 21 at 1106-09. 2~ Camphe/11'. Acutf~Rose Music. 510 U.S. 569 (1994); also see infra at text accompanying notes 
99 113 (endow~ent effect and pricelessness). 
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made him pay for damage done to the dock.30 The view of the law of Nuisance 
expressed in the Second Restatement reflects a similar approach: a failure to pay can 
make otherwise reasonable behavior "unreasonable."31 This contrasts with the more 
traditional tort approach, under which rightful behavior brought no need to pay, 
and wrongful behavior could trigger both monetary and injunctive relief. 
As for copyright, its core tradition too unites injunctive and monetary relief. 
In the typical case where infringement is found, both remedies are available, and 
in the typical case where fair use is found, both remedies are denied. 
Nevertheless. for copyright also, the question of copyright owner's consent is 
sometimes separated from questions of compensation. This is seen most explicitly 
in the many compulsory licenses set up by copyright legislation. 32 
In the judicially formed doctrine of fair use, too, the Supreme Court has suggested 
that sometimes an injunction should be denied (suggesting that the permission of the 
copyright owner need not be sought), but payment should nevertheless be made.33 
Thus, a use may be socially desirable, and it may be unnecessary to obtain the 
owner's consent. but payment may nevertheless be ordered. 















1 S<'<' Restatement ~d of Torts* 826(b) ('"An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use 
an'.l :nJo~.1-~1ent ot land _is unreasonable if ... _(b) the harm caused by the conduct is serious and 
the hn.llKJ,tl hu.rden ot compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the 
contrnuauon o! the conduct not r • "bl ") (Th ffi · · 
... , . .. . . . . 1eas1 e. e o 1c1al comment on clause (b) 1s somewhat 
dc.ircr. It n1.1\ sometimes be reasonable t · · · · · d 
- . •. . o operate an important activity 1f payment 1s ma e 
!or the harm it ts causing. but unreasonable to continue it without paying.") 
Dmdmg the des1nh1htv ofp · f h d · · · · · · f ·k. - , . . .' '. • a.i_me/lf rom t e es1rab1hty of helwvior and from the des1rab1hty ~ .. 1'.t11·' Aing P1d11111sswn is most fam1har from the "takings" area of Constitutional law. Under the 
•· 1 1 men ment. sometimes governin 1 1 . .. 
·h· h r· en must pay t 10se whom 11 has adversely atlected. even \\ en t e e lect w·1s a bv pr d t f · JI 
, ... ·hi . .. . ' ,-_ 0 uc 0 soe1a Y beneficial action and even when the government 
prn111ss1 \ tailed to obtam the af~ected c1·t· , . . 
Tl · tzen s perm1ss10n iere are manv applications f th · h · . 
. h· h, · . 0 e not10n t at a defendant might appropriately receive a 
g:1m t at c may somettmes nevertheless be re ui d . • , . · n C orreC"tire Justil'e and W., l l G . q re to pay for. Sec. e.g .. Juks Colema . 
Gordon 01101\'111·11a/11f· llllg11 lam. II J. Legal Stud. 421, 427 (1982). Also sec WendyJ. 
· ,, ormat1011: ntellectua/ p · . . J I · · 78 V· L Re\· 149 187 (199'') (h · f iopeu1amt1e Res//t11111111arr /111p11/se. a. · 
12 r . . I h ~ erema ter On 0H"ning lnf(mnation J . 
·or examp e. t e statute provides th· t. b . . 
alrcadv been recorded s· 1 b a_ any and can make a "cover·· version of a song that has 
who objects is powerlesst·~p h· y payi~g a statutory fee to the copyright owner. The composer 
to the provisions of the ·st:tu:: ~~;1f 7 t to stop the_makmg of a "cover"' version that conforms 
Incidentally. the compulsor .license U.S.C. sec~1on l l 5(a). 
publicly. To perfiwm a .. cove ~ th , gives a pnvilege to make cover records. not to perform 
· r · ere1ore a band d · · h 1· the copyright owner or (as oc · nee s pcnmsswn. It can he soug t rom 
· curs more often) . r . p 
other collective rights assoc-. t" h a icense can he obtained through BMI. ASCA or 
ta ton t at serves as the owner's representative. 
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In such instances, one might say that the only wrong would be a defendant's 
failure to compensate the plaintiff. Judge Keeton's term, '"conditional fault", is 
useful to refer to such cases. As he pointed out, sometimes '"[i]t is the moral sense 
of the community that one should not engage in [a particular] type of conduct, 
because of risk or certainty of losses to others, without making reasonable 
provision for compensation of losses. " 34 My contention is that conditional fault, 
like other kinds of grounds for defendant liability, can be justified or excused. 
Summary: For a market to serve as a socially acceptable mode of allocating 
resources, ideally (a) the available institutions and technology must provide the 
conditions for perfect competition, such as perfect knowledge and an absence of 
transaction costs, 35 and (b) society must want to distribute the resource in accord 
with efficiency criteria. Among academics, the dominant convention saves the 
term "market failure" for (a) the technical lack of perfect-market conditions. 
However, our pluralistic legal culture demands that we admit that markets can 
also fail when (b) the criteria that perfect markets maximize are simply not the 
criteria of most importance. Therefore it makes sense to use the term "market 
''Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569. 592 n. 10. To represent this graphically. here is 










Excused Defendant loses 
Compare this with how such a parody could be treated after Arnff:Ro.1e if the hint in the 
footnote 10 is taken up by later courts: 
Potentially Potentially 
Justified Excused Defendant loses 
No permission x 
No compensation x 
Behavior x 
34 Robert E. Keeton. Co11ditio11al Fault in the Lall" of" Torts. 72 Harv. L Rev. 401 at 427 28 ( 1959). 
Please note that nothing in Judge Keeton·s an~lysis (or in the instant article) suggests that 
because some harmful actions are permissible when compensation is paid. all harmful actions 
are permissible when compensation is paid. To the contrary. much of the literature on 
commodification and commensurability seeks to identify the actions whose permissibility 
should not be conditioned on compensation and. further. to identify the actions that can be 
made 11T011~fitl by introducing monetary compensation where it does not belong. 
35 These are the assumptions that economists following Adam Smith haYe posited as necessary for 
the attainment of perfect competition and achieving consistency between public and prirnte 
interest. Notable among these assumptions are perfect knowledge. and the absence of 
transaction costs. See Fair Cse as Market Failure. supra note 2. for a brief summary. One of the 
best books examining the limits of the market model is Michael J. Trebilcock. THE LIMITS 
OF THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Harvard UniYersity Press 1993). 
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failure" broadly. whenever we have grounds to believe that bad results will follow 
from adhering to the rule of owner deference. 36 
One can develop rules about the likely failure of rules, 37 and as intimated there 
are at least two categories of occasions when an owner guided by self-interest is 
not likely to act in a way that society can tolerate. The simplest and most familiar 
category might be called. as mentioned above, market malfunction. This is when 
the facts of the real-world market at issue significantly fail to correspond with the 
factual assumptions behind the perfect market modei.38 We are in the domain of 
market malfunction if we feel that if only the deviation from the set of perfect 
market assumptions could be "fixed", the market would be a satisfactory method 
of making the needed decision. 
By contrast. the presence of nonmonetizable interests and other non-monetary 
issues point up the inherent limitations of the market model. We can be in the 
domain of market limitation even if there is no technical problem to "fix" - if we 
would feel uncomfortable using the market to govern how the resource is used 
even if all the conditions of perfect competition were present and satisfied. I define 
cases of "justification" as cases of market limitation. There the market simply is 
the wrong place to look for answers. 
Other kinds of excuse and justification may exist, as we will see when we come 
to assessing the tier I call "behavior". But from the perspective of the market, 
permission and compensation have particular roles: to help align private and 
public action. If the market cannot accomplish that task, either because of a lack 
of normative fit or a problem of technical market conditions. then a defendant 
might appropriately prevail despite a lack of permission and compensation. 
Market limitations and the vocabulary of commodification 
A definitional note regarding the connection between "market limitation" and 
"commodification" is in order. To say that economic norms are inapplicable to a 
-'" This broad use was e 1 d · · · 
,, . . ~p oye m Fair Use as Market Fw/ure; see note 2 supra. 
This can occur m ethics too· s1·t · 1· f d · · h 
. . . . · ua 10ns o uress provide one such category. For example, t e 
ushu.bll r.ule that_ prohibits lymg may be a bad rule for a bank teller to follow when answering a 
ro er s questions about how t h · t h ff · · !x 1 . · 0 ow o s ut o a pohce-warnmg system 
n instances of market malf t. " " · · · · 
d . . . unc ion. iacts ia1l to correspond to perfect-market facts. The ec1s1on-maker will face an in't'· l . · · · d 
. b .f h _ 1 ia normatJve mqmry - namely whether a m·irket norm shout gm ern - ut 1 s e lmds the k t · · • 
subsequent t' f mar.~ norm apphcahle. she will focus most of her efforts on the 
market l ·mqt~t~s ionbo what empmcal facts are presented by the given situation. In the case of 1 1 a 10n. y contrast the d · · k · If 
· . d . Sh . · ecis1on-ma er sees the perfect-market norm as 1tse 
ma equate. e will focus much of h ff . . 
and d ·d· h. h er e ort on 1denllfying and clarifying alternative norms 
ec1 mg w ic one(s) should govern the presented situation. 
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given relation will often lead to the conclusion that the relation should not be 
commodified - which can involve denying a putative "owner" any right to sue in 
the given context. 39 This link between market limitation and commodification 
should hardly be controversial. Yet it may strike some readers that "things" rather 
than "contextual relations" are the appropriate focus of the commodification 
debate. 
Admittedly, for reasons of academic path-dependence, debates over commo-
dification often center on asking what "things" should or should not be 
commodified, as if resources could be permanently placed in one category (say. 
"property" or ··commodity") or another (say, "personal" or ""not tradable on a 
marker'). However. as Margaret Jane Radin has pointed out, most resources are 
susceptible to varying categories.40 with the result depending largely on the 
relation between persons, or between persons and the resource. I share Radin\ 
relational perspective.4 1 
When most of the relations regarding a thing are best handled outside the 
market. we are likely to place that ""thing" in the category of things that cannot be 
owned. But that is only a presumptive categorization. It can be reversed. For 
example, consider the way that copyright protection extends to works of 
expression but does not extend to an author's ideas. 4~ Just as "fair use" allows 
an exception to the usual presumption that works of expressive authorship can be 
exclusively owned, the presence of certain relations can undo the usual 
presumption that ideas cannot be owned. 
It may be useful to explore this last example. In copyright. as I just suggested. 
people who create ideas have no property right to exclude others from using them. 
even if the ideas are embedded in a copyrightable work of expression. The reasons 
for so denying commodity status to ideas has both to do with economics (e.g .. 
"ideas" are best exploited in diverse ways by non-centralized actors),43 and with 
non-economic notions of personality. autonomy and fairness (e.g., "ideas·· 
>'J There are many aspects to making something a commodity: the right to sell is one aspect that is 
often discussed. and another is the right to sue to exclude others. A decision against 
commodification can affect one or many such characteristics. 
40 Margaret Jane Radin . . \1arke1-/11a/ie11ahi/iry. 100 Harv. L. Rev. 18 (1987): Margaret Jane 
Radin. Justice and the .'Harket Domain, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE: NOMOS XXXI 165 
(John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds .. 1989). 
41 Persons adhering to a "thing" view of commodification might be said to have a "subject 
matter" perspective on the topic. Persons open to a "relational" view might be said to believe 
that "scope of rights" also matters for commodification. Since in most of intellectual proper!~. 
subject matter and scope of rights always trade off against each other. cf.. Robert A. Gorman. 
Copyright Protection For The Co//£'Ctio11 And Represe11tatio11 O( Facts. 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1569 
( 1%3) at 1602. for intellectual property scholars a view of commodification that goes beyond 
4 , "thingness·· is practically inevitable. 
- 17 U .S.C. section I 02(b). 
4
·' Compare Edmund Kitch. The .Vat11re and F1111ction of' the Patent System. 20 J.L. & Econ. 265 
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the defendant enjoined. Alternatively, should it be decided that the copies should 
be made and distributed (issue A), and that the owner's voluntary licensing is 
unlikely to function appropriately (issue B), a court may yet decide that the 
defendant should pay compensation (issue C). 
For tangibles. the desirability of the defendant's behavior - isolated from 
questions of compensation - can be a matter of much dispute. This is true from 
the perspective either of market economics or of other norms. For tangibles, 
sometimes market failure can cause a lack of permission to be excused or 
justified. but the undesirability of the behavior itself can lead the court to find in 
favor of the plaintiff on the basis of an all-things-considered decision. 52 To put 
it another way. behavior is undesirable if we can say "'even if the plaintiff was 
compensated. and even if the plaintiff gave permission, this behavior should not 
occur." With tangibles. therefore, much investigation is necessary to assess 
whether a behavior is value-maximizing or otherwise desirable. 
For intangibles. by contrast. it is fairly hard to imagine a use that is not 
desirable so long as concerns regarding compensation are satisfied. Defendant's 
use usually does not interfere with plaintiffs ability to use the intangible. 
Because copyright like patent deals with inexhaustible public goods. we can 
light each other's candles without diminishing the light from our own. 53 
Admittedly. some speech can be undesirable on the merits. Consider, for 
example. hate speech. This is not desirable behavior. Nevertheless. it is unlikely to 
trigger legal sanction because of the First Amendment. 
Interestingly. such treatment can be seen either through the lens of 
justification or excuse. Because of the First Amendment. judges are not likely 
to assess the merits of a defendant's message in deciding whether his copying is 
infringing or "fair". Rather. because of the free speech concerns, the defendant's 
beha\'ior is likely to be assessed at a higher level of generality: say. his 
participating in public debate. 54 Viewed with such generality, the behavior is 
justifiable. Alternatively. focusing on the defendant's message itself. we might 
'~ Whctl~a or not compensation is paid to the injured party. a value-maximizer does not want 
wastdul acts to occur. Snrnlarly. under other norms there are behaviors that cannot be made 
" '.'.cccptable hy .haYing ~he gaining party pay the injured party. 
· · He who receives an idea from me. receives instruction himself without lessening mine: as he 
who lights hts taper at mme. receives light without darkening me." Graham v. John Deere Co .. 
383 U:S. I. 9 n.~ (1966) (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON. at 180--81 (Washington ed. 1903)) . 
. Admi~tedly. one can imagin.e a contrary case: for example. if a software pirate creates three 111.tlli~n rnptes.":hile the_c?pynght owne.r has already created three million copies. there will be 
\\ '.tst~.d. pr'.'dUllton .costs tf only four mtlhon people desire a copy of the software at or above 
marg111,il rnsL But although such a case can be imagined. copying that is undesirable in itself is 
emp1ncalh hkelv to be rare 
'
4 It is our institu"tional comm. 1'tme t t th F' b 
. . 
11 o e irst Amendment that allows such speech to e d1ssemmatcd. rather than the merits of what is said. 
Sometimes the law responds to h· f I h 
. . . arm u speec . For example. when someone quotes a target 
out lli context m order to he about h' h 1 f · · · · 
tm. t e aw o hbel may respond. dcpendmg, mtcr aha. on 
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say that quoting from a copyrighted work as part of socially destructive speech is 
"excused'" by the institutional considerations mandated by the First Amend-
ment. Hate speech is not something we want to be emulated, but it is something 
to which our legal sanctions are not well suited. 
Whether under the rubric of excuse or of justification, then, for copyright most 
of the difficult issues arise not with behavior, but with permission and 
compensation. This is the reason why it is particularly important for under-
standing intellectual property to divide the defense inquiry into three parts. Too 
often we think of defenses in terms of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of behavior. 
For copyright, the behavior of copying is almost always rightful, or at least 
institutionally excused. The hard issues arise in relation to '1011· the copying should 
be done: pursuant to voluntary licensing under the market system, subject to an 
obligation to compensate the copyright owner, or freely. As to those issues, it can 
be helpful to identify if the market is functioning and whether market norms are 
applicable. 
B. LACK OF PERMISSION 
Assuming the goal of copyright is to achieve maximum social benefit, there is no 
reason to require a potential user of a work to ask the copyright owner's 
permission unless there is some way to believe the owner's self-interest is aligned 
with society's. When this is not the case - when for example social and private 
costs markedly diverge, or the interests involved are not monetizable - seeking 
permission should not be required. 
As for justification, the commodification literature provides abundant 
examples of resources that justifiably should not be owned in the sense that they 
should not be subject to sale. Where the public interest cannot be evaluated in 
monetary terms, it makes no sense to treat owner self-interest as if it were likely to 
generate socially desirable outcomes. 
When by contrast there is a technical failure of market functioning (typically. 
the presence of significant transaction costs). I would say the defendant who has 
not obtained permission is potentially "excused". He may be acting rightfully in 
CU/If. 
whether the target was a public figure and whether the plaintiff spoke with reckless disregard of 
the truth. 
Note that elsewhere in this essay I recommend that judges allow themselves at least to admit 
when harm is caused bv a work of authorship. and to allow speech in responses that mitigates 
harm. See the discussi~rn i11/i·a accompanying footnotes 67- 73 and accompanying text. One 
might debate whether that recommendation. and the caselaw on which it is based. is 
inconsistent with the supposed neutrality of the '"marketplace of ideas .. notion. and how the 
recommendation tits with alternative conceptions of the First Amendment. 
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not obtaining permission - or wrongly - but it is an empirical economist who can 
tell us if requiring permission would maximize value. 
There are also cases on the borderline between excuse and justification. For 
example. sometimes we cannot trust the owner's judgment because there simply 
is no stable answer to .. where is the highest valued use in monetary terms." 
Cases of unstable value could, on the one hand, be classified with cases of 
justification, since in the end a non-monetary metric will be needed. On the 
other hand, perhaps these should be classified as cases of excuse, since many 
such cases can still be fruitfully addressed through a quasi-economic 
con seq uentialist calculation. This issue will be discussed below, under the 
heading of .. pricelessness." 
C. LACK OF COMPENSATION 
In the domain of market malfunction and .. excuse", the desirability of 
compensation is by definition measured by economic effect. Here we can 
usefully borrow from Frank Michelman's classic treatment of the analogous 
question of whether governmentally inflicted injuries should be compensated.55 
He suggests there are at least two primary reasons why a value-maximizing 
economist might favor requiring the government to pay compensation for acts 
that. while facially desirable from a societal point of view, inflict injury on 
private parties. 
First. paying compensation keeps the harm-causer honest. If the defendant (the 
government) has to pay. it will not use the plaintiffs resource without being sure 
that the behavior contemplated will in fact generate enough benefit to outweigh 
the costs. 
Second. paying compensation averts the "'demoralization costs" that can occur 
if the citizenry feels itself vulnerable to losing its investments at the whim of others. 
Professor Michelman suggests that the citizenry might work less hard in general if 
people thought their efforts might come to naught because of uncompensated 
governmental injury. 
For copyright. we do not have to worry much about the first consideration. 
Given the inexhaustibility of intangible public goods, it will usually happen that 
copying and other uses of copyrighted works will in fact generate more benefits 
than costs. But the second consideration, what Professor Michelman called 
"'dem~mtlization co~ts": has great importance in the copyright area - though in 
copyright. demorahzat10n costs go by their more familiar name "'incentive 
effects." ' 
" Frank L Michelman Propatr LY/"t · / c: · , · 1· 
.. 1 . (' , . . .: · · 11 .l • anc rwrness: C omme11ts 011 1/11! Ethical F1111111/a111111s o 
11.11 Olllf'<ll.ll//1m1 Lmr. RO Harv.L.Rev. 1165 (1967) 
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In cases of excuse. where wealth maximization provides the appropriate 
norm. the incentive effects are likely to be crucial to the analysis. The legislature 
has presumptively decided what desirable incentive effects should be. If a grant 
of fair use substantially impairs those incentives, then a court might logically 
refuse to grant fair use treatment, or premise fair use on an obligation to 
compensate. 
What of justification? If something we value is degraded by being priced. a 
judge may think it inadvisable to order compensation. Yet, ordering compensa-
tion may not be the same as selling. 56 Therefore. even in these cases, 
compensation might be a good idea if we made sure that any orders to pay 
were limited to cases where a defendant reaped enough monetary he11efit to pay 
and stillfind it profitahle to make the use. 57 Then plaintiff would be paid, and the 
defendant would be able to speak, and the realm of public discourse would still 
profit from defendant's work. However. as I suggest in the final section of this 
essay,58 there can be significant problems even with such limited orders to 
compensate. 
The chart on the next page may be a helpful summary of the discussion. 
The justification of self-defense and its potential role regarding 
parody 
One of the most interesting questions in ··fair use" has to do with whether 
copyright owners should be empowered to enjoin persons who copy from their 
work in order to criticize. parody, or otherwise lampoon them. From a 
"justification" perspective, the answer seems clear: no such injunction should be 
56 See the discussion in Marnaret Jane Radin. CONTESTED COMMODITIES at 184-205 
, 7 (Harvard University Press 1°996). . . 
· If a defendant merely has to disgorge a monetary benefit. he or she 1s unhkely to be harmed. 
As scholars of restitution law have observed. one cannot always sell what one has received 
(services and goods may have been consumed; the markets may be distant; etc.) and no one can 
afford to pay for everything he or she might desire. Giving someone a service or a good and 
then requiring payment for it may make that person worse off than he or she would have been 
without the service or the product. Should a court require the defendant to pay for .somethmg 
non-monetary that he or she has gained, the defendant could indeed he harmed. Rest1tullon law 
has long take~ these considcratio;1s into account in an attempt to protect defendants from being 
made worse off after a restitution suit than they would have been had they never received a 
benefit from the plaintiff. Sec Gordon. On 0ll'11i11g !11fi>rma1io11. supra note _31 ~1t text 
accompanying note 226 and following. The suggestion to utilize this approach tor latr use 
. purposes was made hv Megan Richardson. 
:"H • .._ 
Sec the Post-Snipt. i11fi«1 at pages 188 er seq. 
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Summary of Analysis 
Potential Potential excuse - Neither excuse nor 
justification: "malfunction" in justification applies: 
"inherent limitation" market Defendant loses 
on market use 
No permission The market norm is The market norm Either the market norm and 
not what should and monetary monetary measures are 
govern OR money is criterion are appropriate and the market 
not a good measure of appropriately applied is working. OR some other 
welfare in this context. but the market is consideration60 leads a 
not working.59 court to favor honoring the 
owner's property right. 
No compensation Even if payment could Market breakdown Either the market norm is 
be practicably made. it makes it difficult for appropriate and the market 
would be normatively defendant to pay. 61 is functioning, or for some 
wrong to make the other reason (e.g., fairness) 
defendant pay. compensation is a good idea 
Behnior The defendant's Undesirable behavior Some behavior should be 
behavior is desirable. 62 might be excused stoppcd04 regardless of 
Still need to assess if for reasons other whether the harmed person 
permission or than its merits.63 consents or receives 
compensation is required. compensationM 
59 Example: the defendant may be excused for not obtaining the plaintiffs permission if there is 
such a short period of time between the defendant realizing she will need to use the plaintiffs 
copyrighted work and the time when the use must be implemented. that she is unable to send a 
permission request capable of being acted on in a timely fashion. 
"
0 One example of such other consideration is autonomy. Another is Neil Netanel's "robust civil 
sphere ... Netanel, supra note 6. Another might be Milton Friedman's notion that private property 
promotes political freedom. 
"
1 An example might be when the cost of contacting the owner is larger than the value of the use. 
As another example. consider a critic who generates significant positive externalities when he 
quotes from the copyrighted work 
"
2 If defendant's behavior is desirable, one still needs to look at issues of compensation and 
pernmsion to know whether plaintiff or defendant should prevail. Note: In copyright. this 
,, 1 paper sug_gests. a defendant's behavior is likely to be desirable. 
· As a possible exa?1ple of speech that may be undesirable but excused hy First Amendment and 
mstttutlonal con~1derat1ons. consider a neo-Nazi who quotes from others' copyrighted works as 
part of a campaign of hate. 
M The '"undesirable behavior" could be stopped either by letting plaintiff win a civil suit against 
defendant, or hy th~ govern_ment bringing a criminal or regulatory action. or hy private self-
"' help. _Th_e defendants act i:mg~t be cabined in many different ways. 
This 1s hnked to issues of mahenability. 
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allowed. A paradigm instance of when we do not want a speaker to obtain a 
copyright owner"s permission is when the speaker's use will be critical of the 
copyrighted work. If truth is a merit good that should be available without regard 
to payment, then a judge should not even order compensation. 66 
Further, many critical and parodic uses are essentially acts of self-defense, 
where someone who has been affected by an iconic work seeks to undo its negative 
effect on him or her. 67 This is the case with Alice Randall, author of The Wind 
Done Gone. Randalrs novel seeks to undermine and parody Margaret Mitchelrs 
Gone With The Wind through use of Mitchelrs own characters. Randall in a recent 
interview made clear that Gone With The Wind had injured her. and many other 
African-Americans. Randall said she would rather have been "'born blind'" if 
blindness would have enabled her to avoid reading Mitchell's novel,68 so great was 
the emotional harm she felt. 
As a privilege allows one to respond to a threat of physical harm in the law of 
battery. self-help is also potentially justifiable in the law of copyright. This has 
been recognized in fair use case law under the label of ""rebuttal". As the Ninth 
Circuit observed in a case where Jerry Falwell as part of a fund-raising effort sent 
his supporters photocopies of a Hustler magazine attack on him: 
[A]n individual in rebutting a copyrighted work containing derogatory 
information about himself may copy such parts of the work as are necessary 
to permit understandable comment. Falwell did not use more than was 
reasonably necessary to make an understandable comment when he copied the 
entire parody from the magazine. . .. [T]he public interest in allowing an 
individual to defend himself against such derogatory personal attacks serves to 
rebut the presumption of unfairness. 69 
Thus. although the First Amendment barred Falwell from suing Hustler for the 
emotional damage the attack caused him. 70 the First Amendment did not bar the 
"<' See the discussion of Posner. infi·a at note 124. 
"
7 I do not propose that one harm ··justifies"' the victim committing a responsive harm. I am 11111 
talking about revenge. Rather. I am talking about reducing the harmful effects caused by the 
copyright owner's w~ork. 
In the emotional realm. we acknowledge that merely speaking a trauma can help undo its 
effect. (Sec. e.g .. the work of psychologist Alice Miller. FOR YOUR OWN GOOD (Farrar. 
Straus & Giroux 1984)). This is true in the cultural realm as well. Giving voice can be curative. 
"" See the Connection website for Julv 16. 2001 with guest Alice Randall talking about her book. 
THE WIND DONE GONE (H~ughton Miftlin Company 2001 ). which criticizes GONE 
WITH THE WIND bv means of writing a new novel that uses some of Mitchell"s characters: 
<http: WW\\ .theconn~ction.orn archive 200 I 07. 07 l 6b.shtml > 
~~ Hustler Magazim: Inc. v. MonJ Majority Inc .. 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986) at I~ 53.. . . 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. 485 U.S. 46 ( 1988) (when H11s1/er made fun of Falwell 111 .1 
lampoon th:tt was both disgusting and untrue. the Supreme Court ruled that the First 
Amendment barred his suit f<;r intentional intliction of emotional distress.) 
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court from giving Falwell a "self-help privilege" of self-defense assertable under 
the label of fair use. 71 
That the judge's self-defense argument puts us in the realm of inherent market 
limitation rather than market malfunction is patent. Nothing in the judge's 
discussion of the dispute between Hustler and Falwell's Moral Majority attempts 
to balance the harms and benefits. 
To embrace self-defense within fairness does not mean the justification inquiry 
requires a judge to wander without guidance. Several articulable normative 
structures can give content to a notion of '"fairness" that is sensitive to self-
defense. One such structure is Lockean natural rights. 
Locke suggested that property rights could arise from labor providing that the 
laborer left ··enough. and as good" in the common for others. 72 Building on that 
Lockean proviso. I have argued that works of authorship that do harm (such as 
the Hustler attack and the racist portions of Gone With The Wind) should not have 
the aid of the Jaw in doing so. That is. a copyright owner whose work has harmed 
someone has no natural right to prevent the harmed party from quoting or 
copying the injurious work in an attempt to undo its effects. 73 Such quotation or 
copying is justified. 
It might be argued that behavior cannot be "justified" by reference to harms 
caused by speech. since the First Amendment requires all of us to bear most speech 
harms without legal recourse. But the caselaw seems to draw a dividing line 
between rights to sue (which the First Amendment can bar). and rights to self-
help: While the First Amendment precluded Falwell from bringing suit for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress to recompense the injury he felt Hustler 
had caused him. the court under "fair use" gave Falwell a privilege to use self-help. 
and to quote or copy the injurious work in an attempt to undo its effect.74 
Lockean natural rights would come to the same result. 75 
-1 
It might be argued that ape · I· tt· -k ( b H · - If d " e 
... ',, . -. _ . rsona a ac as y ustler agamst Falwell) generates a se - eiens ~n~_ih:ge that 15 not available when a group is attacked. By contrast. I think the two cases 
sul ltc1entlv analogous - ·ind the pr bl f I 1 · · · f · · ups 
- . · . ~ ' o em o cu tura marg111ahzat1011 o mmonty gro 
sutl1c1entlv senous - that the F J • II . Id b · · ·1 e 
. · _ · a v.e case cou e treated as smtable precedent for the pnv1 eg 
_, ol group self-delense. 
- John Locke. TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287 88 (Peter Laslctt ed .. 2d ed. I967l 
7·' (J~ ed. 1698. corrected by Locke) (bk. n. ~ 27). 
Wendv 1. Gordon A Prop 1. R' I · SI· · · I' 
,,-,, 1111.;i/ L 1 . . • er .l 'R 11 Ill e.f-Expression: Equalitr and /11diritlua!tsm Ill I It 
R . . It. 5a111.1E'1 Intell:ctua/ Property. 102 Yale L. J. 1533-1609 (1991) (hereinafter A Property 
, 4 ig ' /11 e - xpresswn J. -
~:1~~\°e~1g~:~1~~:~ t~n~~~e:ustler for dan:iages. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
purposes of . · . under the fair use doctrine to photocopy the lfustler lampoon for 
F "d I 148 (9rtah1scmg mloney to defend himself. Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Moral Majority Inc .. 796 
,; ·- If. 986) at J 153. 
· Gordon 4 Propertr R' I · S /'''£ 
· · · ig 11111 e.r xpression. supra note 73. 
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Pricelessness and private censorship 
The above discussion suggests that some critics and parodists can use self-defense 
as an argument for fair use. Such an argument lies in the realm of justification. 
What I want to explore now is the possibility that even economic norms can lead 
to a substantial privilege for critics. That is. I aim to prove that for critical speech, 
a speaker who has not sought the owner's consent or who proceeds against an 
owner's consent has a potential excuse as well as a justification. 76 In instances or 
private censorship. free speech is not the only value that dictates a defendant 
victory. Economics. too. can lead to the same result. It will be useful to examine 
this example in some detail, borrowing both from the economics literature and the 
literature on commodification. 77 
In the most recent ··fair use" case before the Supreme Court. the opinion 
indicated that fair use could be justified in part as a response to situations in which 
copyright owners are unlikely to give permission at virtually any price. 78 Other 
cases have taken the same position. 79 This position. advanced in a case involving a 
song parody, might strike the reader as inconsistent with the usual economic 
assumption that one must take preferences as a given. If one takes this notion 
seriously - it is sometimes known as the assumption of "consumer sovereignty" 
then it seems the Court should have accorded as much respect to the copyright 
owner's desire not to be parodied as to any other value. After all, in theory. an 
unwillingness to sell or license merely indicates that the potential buyer/licensee is 
not the highest-valued user. So it may seem wrongheaded of the Supreme Court to 
suggest that it may be appropriate to give a parodist - a disappointed licensee · the 
liberty to copy for free on the ground that the owner would not sell him a license. 
Is the Court under-valuing the owner's preferences'! Not necessarily; there arc 
7~ Also see the discussion of Richard Posner's position, see infi'a notes 80 and 124. 
77 The material on pricelessness and endowment effect borrows from my prior work. particularly 
Wendy J. Gordon. On the Economics of' Copyright. Restitlllion. and "Fair L'w ":Systemic Versus 
Case-By-Case Respm1ses ro Mark£'/ Failure. 8 Journal of Law and Information Science 
(Australia) 7 ( 1997) and Wendy J. Gordon. Tmrard a Jurisprudmce of Benefits: The Norms of 
Coprright and the Pmhle111 oj'Prirate Censorship. 57 U. Chi. L. Rn. 1009 (review essay. 1990). 
78 See C~mpbell v. Acuff-Ro~e. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In assessing the plaintiffs claim that the 
parody would impair their potential market. the Court responded: ""[T]he unlikelihood that 
creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions 
removes such u';;es from the very notion of a potential licensing market." 510 U.S. at 592. 
79 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar point in Fisher\'. Dees. 794 F.2d 432 (9th 
Cir. 1986) ("The parody defense to copyright infringemen.t exists precisely to make possible a 
use that generally cannot be bought."). For other cases 111rnh111? s11111lar ant1-d1sscm111at1on 
motives on the part of copyright proprietors. see Gordon. Fair l se as Alarket Fmlure. suprn 
note 2. and Gordon. Tmrnrd a Jurisprudence o/' Benefits. supra note 77 at 1632 33. 
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several explanations of the Court's approach that are consistent with the 
traditional economic deference to individual preferences.80 
When a copyright owner refuses to let someone adapt her work for purposes of 
parodying it, or refuses to give an ideological opponent permission to quote lengthy 
passages, or insists on suing anyone who quotes passages of her memoirs that 
reflect unfavorably on her, she is using her copyright as a tool of suppression. 81 The 
question of whether authors should be entitled to refuse permission to those users 
of whom they disapprove is a complex one. For example, there can be practical 
problems in distinguishing improperly motivated suppression from a refusal to 
license motivated by a desire to maximize financial return.82 More important than 
the practical problems may be a conceptual one. If the proper way to look at these 
problems were economic, then, as mentioned, the principles of consumer 
sovereignty would seem to dictate that governmental decision-makers should not 
question why someone refuses to sell or license.83 Economics ··assum[es] that man is 
a rational maximizer of his ends in life, "84 and a desire to suppress would seem to 
be as rational an end as a desire for fame or fast cars. 
Additionally, Ronald Coase has persuasively emphasized the importance of 
transaction costs by showing that, in their absence, the ultimate allocation of a 
xo Jud.ge .Posner admits. ""it may be in the private interest of the copyright owner, but not in the 
social mterest. to suppress criticism of the work". Richard A. Posner, When ls Parodi' Fair Use, 
::1 J. ~e¥al Stud. 67 at 73 (1992). He also treats ··reluctan[ce] to license"" as a factor ihat should 
larnr lair use. id. at 71. However. he is not clear as to what methodologv he uses to reach that 
conclusion. His stated reason for his conclusion - that we should enco~~age the production of 
truth. 11/. at 74 - suggests that he is using a mixture of economic and noneconomic norms. See 
note 124 i11fi-a. 
xi Similar insiances also appear in the corporate realm. For example. when a newspaper expanded 
its TV cm·erage It told Its readership about the extended service in an advertisement that 
pictured a c~pyrighted TV Guide cover for purposes of comparison. TV Guide then sued for 
copyngl.11 mlrmgcment. Presumably the suit was motivated by something other than a desire for 
hccnsc ;ee.s. The. comparative advertising was held to be a fair use. See Triangle Publications. 
xc l~ic '" Krnght-.R1dder Newspapers. Inc .. 626 F. Supp. 1171 (5th Cir. 1980). 
I-or example. II can be difficult to distinguish suppression from an attempt to direct the work mt<~ the most valuable denYallve work markets. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT Vol I 
at ) 71 · 73 (little. Brown and Company 1989) (rights over derivative works can affect the dire~t1on of mvestment and the type of works prod'Uced). 
. Simih'.rly. m regard to unpublished works. it can be difficult to distinguish cases of 
~uppress~on from cas~s of economically motivated refusals to license. An author accused of 
st·I·p~hr:~si~n may be simply trying to keep the work out of the public eye temporarily until it 
rcac cs ~~s mature form and can be published. 
Even 11 some practical means · t d d' · · · · .. h 
. . ex1s e to 1stmgmsh all d1ssemblmg "suppressors from t ose 
rnpvnght owners who are ge · J · · t 
· · nume Y mollvated hy financi·tl return some c·1ses will presen 
mstances of truly mixed m f , F ' " " · · 
. 11 ,. · : 0 I\es. or example, the owner of copvright in an out-of-pnnt co cc lion of letters might sue ab' . h h · · f · 
d"l'k r . . wgrap er w o extensively quotes the letters, not only out o a is 1 e 1or the b10grapher s me . · . · t 
reserve the . ssage or perceived maccuracics. hut also nut of a desire o 
&ir 1976) . rep,rmdt market for the letters. See Meeropol v. Nizer 417 F. Supp. 120 I. 1208 (2d 
· · ier' an remanded 5"0 F 2d 1061 2 · ' ' (1978) 
x3 Th. d" · h ' - · ( d Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 10 Li · 
c 1scuss10n t at follows draws in t G . .. . 
note 77 at 104"--4~ par on ordon. Tolt'ard a J11rispmde11n' of Beneflls .. wpra 
X4 · - - ' 
Richard A. Posner ECONOMIC AN 
. ALYSIS OF LAW 3 (5th ed. Aspen Puhlishcrs 1998). 
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resource will be efficient regardless of how entitlements are initially assigned. 8) So 
long as the parties can meet face to face, as in copyright a copyright owner and 
potential parodist or critic could often do, why should there be any need for the 
judiciary to do anything but enforce whatever property right is before it? 
Whether suppression would or would not be economically desirable will depend 
in most cases on empirical analysis of the particular fact pattern.86 But some general 
observations can indicate preliminarily why. when copyright owners seek to use the 
copyright law to enforce attempts at suppression, neither consumer sovereignty nor 
the Coase Theorem suggest that judges give the owners automatic deference. 87 
At least four reasons suggest that the market cannot always be relied upon to 
mediate attempts at suppression and that it might be economically desirable to 
refuse authors an entitlement to suppress. 88 The four reasons are the ""suppression 
triangle"; pecuniary effects; managerial discretion; and what I call "'pricelessness". 
In addition, of course, it is possible that economics is not the right way to view this 
matter at all. The four reasons are interrelated, and to explicate them let me begin 
with the ··suppression triangle." 
I. SUPPRESSION TRIANGLE 
I use the term "suppression triangle"89 to point to the fact that in cases involving 
" See Ronald H. Coase. The Proh/em of Social Cost. 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 ( 1960). Efficiency will occur 
in the absence of factors such as transaction costs. wealth or endowment effects. and strategic 
behavior. See id (transaction costs). See also. e.g., Donald Regan. The Proh/e111 of Social Cost 
Rerisited. 15 J. Lmr & Econ. 427 ( 1972) (strategic behavior). Compare Ronald H. Coase. Notes 
on the Prohlem of' Social Cost. in THE FIRM. THE MARKET. AND THE LAW 157 
(University of Chicago Press 1988). 
86 Even if one interprets copyright's economic goal as being solely the use of incentives to 
··promote knowledge." so that satisfying the copyright owner's personal tastes would not count 
as an independent value. the empirical answer to suppression questions would not be easy: in a 
given case enforcing any particular type of suppression would both keep some knowledge secret. 
and yield long-term incentives that could aid knowledge in the long run (because authors who 
can suppress have a copyright worth more than authors who cannot). Cf. Michelman. 
Property. L'tility & Fairness. supra note 55 (the effects of demoralization on productivity). 
Which of the two potential effects on knowledge would be greater (the loss from enforcing 
suppression or the gain from long-term incentives) cannot be determined a priori. 
87 For a fuller discussion of this issue. see Wendy J. Gordon. ""The Right Not to Use .. 
(unpublished manuscript). 
xx Additional reasons might include. e.g .. the potential nonmonetizability of first amendment 
values. See. Fair l.i.w' as 1Harket Failure. supra note 2. at 1631 32. 
89 I base this theory in part on the work of James Lindgren in the blackmail area. See James 
Lindgren. Unrarelin~ the Paradox of Blackmail. 84 Colum. L. Rev. 670 ( 1984) (discussing the 
three-party structur~ involved). For ~n economic analysis of blackmail stressing other aspects of 
blackmail activity. see Ronald H. Coase. The /91:17 McCorkle Lecfllre: Blackmail. 74 Va. L. Rev. 
655. 673-74 (1988). 
I am indebted to Warren Schwartz for suggesting the potential relevance of the blackmail 
literature to this problem. 
175 
WENDY J. GORDON 
the suppression of information or other intellectual products. 90 at least three 
parties are affected: (I) the person who seeks or threatens to make the contested 
use (for example. the potential parodist). (2) the copyright owner who wants to 
keep the material from being copied or adapted (the potential suppressor). and (3) 
the person or persons who would want to see the material (the potential 
recipients). This is the triangle of affected interests. Yet in the suppression 
transaction typically only two parties are present: the potential user (such as a 
parodist). and the copyright owner. Whether an attempt to suppress is likely to be 
value-maximizing will depend, inter alia, on how well the interest of the omitted 
third party. the class of potential recipients, is represented by the two immediate 
participants. 
Theoretically, the more valuable the parody or other use is to the public, the 
more the public should be willing to pay for it, and the more the parodist should 
be willing and able to bid for permission. Thus. the notion of the Invisible Hand91 
expects that any market participant will be in a position to reflect the interests of 
affected third parties (that is, the public audience). Nevertheless, the Invisible 
Hand often falters, and the possibility of misallocation remains. 
Consider a hypothetical novelist or moviemaker who wants to keep the world 
from knowing what a hostile critic or parodist has to say about his work. Assume 
also that the critic or parodist wants to quote from the work or use its imagery, 
and that use of the quotation or imagery is somehow essential to the 
comprehensibility or believability of the criticism or parody.92 If the law required 
the critic or parodist to purchase licenses to quote or paraphrase, how sure could 
we be that the "highest-valued"' use would ensue'? 
For purposes of mathematical example, assume that the critic or parodist 
stands to earn at most a $1,000 profit from even the best-written product. Assume 
that the novelist or film-maker would lose $50,000 if the criticism or parody were 
published. Since the copyright owner would charge at least $50.000 for a license to 
:riticize o~ ri?icule his work, and the critic or parodist stands to gain only $1.000 
lrom pubhshmg. it may look like the copyright owner holds the "highest valued'" 
use when compared with the parodist or critic. But that may be an illusion 
"
0 Data can implicat d"ffi · . . . . . ·. 
. . e I erent Issues than can. e.g., literary exprcsswn. I-or purposes of this very 
general d1scuss10n however I h· II II · · · · .. 
<JI ~ . · · s a group a together under the rubm: ··mtormat1on. Adam Smith argued that pe I · h · · · · · 
. . .· . . _ope _pursumg t e1r selt-mterest will come to results that are m t~~~ ;~t~ ~~~L';ed. as if gmded by an .. invisible hand'". Adam Smith. AN INQUIRY 
"2 Th . HOF NATIONS 423 (Modern Library 1917) 
ere 1s another factor that may b . t k h . · · . · s· ·e 
d . ea wor ere as well: the 1dea.express1on dichotomy. 1m; un er current law copyright 0 . · · Id h d h . wners cannot prevent others from using their 1dC'ls 1t cou e argue t at little suppress·o f I . . · . . · ~ . ' · · h· t 
· h c 11 . 1 n ° note cou d occur. For s11nphc1ty's sake therefore. assume t •1 m t e 10 owmg examples wh· t h d 1· • Id h 
·d d . a ever t e e endant has taken from the first ·1rtist"s work cou e cons1 ere copynght·1bl · · · ' · · · h 
, · h d . ' . e expression rather than simply .. idea" and that the use ot t e 
cop} ng te expression 1s somehow . . t·· I h · · · · k 
essen Ia tot c eftect1vcness of the planned dcnvative wor · 
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resulting from the fact that the third party (in the owner/user/public triangle) is 
not being counted as part of the deal. 
The publishing of the review or parody might benefit the public (who would 
thus be warned off from, say, a much-hyped romance novel that does not really 
excite anyone who reads past page five). Perhaps the public gains something like 
that same $50,000. or perhaps even more. On these hypothesized facts, requiring 
the publisher to seek a license from someone who would not sell it is a bad idea. 
and giving the publisher (the critic or parodist) free use is a good idea. Both are 
consistent with economic measures of value. If the critic had been able to capture 
the full value that the review gave to the audience, then the novelist's $50,000 
minimum asking price would have been met. 
A parodist may similarly be unable to capture the full value that the work 
holds for the audience. This can occur for many reasons. 93 There may be 
significant positive externalities and surplus in the market for parodies, for 
example. There also may be other complications in the markets for reviews and 
parodies. such as pecuniary losses that diverge from societal economic losses. 
2. PECUNIARY LOSSES 
Much of the loss that can come from a critical review will often be merely 
pecuniary, reflecting not a net loss to society but rather a shifting of revenues from 
one novelist to another and possibly better one.94 Say. for example, that after a 
negative review of the copyright owner's book. audiences turn to a better novelist's 
book. It begins to sell well and generates more than $50.000 in royalties that would 
not otherwise have been earned. It is as if the triangle now were a geometric figure 
with four points (the criticized novelist. the critic. the public, and the better 
novelist). If one could add to the $1,000 the reviewer could offer for a ""license to 
criticize" the $50.000 that the better novelist would reap, plus the amount that 
consumers gain from avoiding a bad book, the total value generated by the review 
would be enough to outweigh the initial copyright owner's pecuniary loss. Since 
this hypothetical additur is highly unlikely to happen.95 mere pecuniary losses may 
y_, As economist Michael L Katz writes of the similar problem in the research and development 
area: In the absence of perfect discrimination. the firm conducting the R & D will be unable to 
appropriate all of the surplus generated by the licensing of its R & D. and the firm will sell its R 
& D results at prices that lead to inefficiently low levels of utilization by other firms. Michael L 
Katz. An A11alrsis o(Coopcratire Reseaffh and Dere/opme111. 4 Rand J. Econ. 5'27. 527 (1986). 
94 5iee Richard A. Po~ner. ""Conventionalist Defenses of Law as an Autonomous Discipline .. I 7 
(September 2 I. 1987) (unpublished manuscript using pecuniary effects to explain why 
landowners who create certain positive spillovers are not entitled to payment from those who 
benefited). 
Y> Journalistic ethics would undoubtedly forbid reviewers of a given book to accept subsidies from 
the authors of competing hooks. 
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take on an importance they should not have and they might prevent socially 
desirable licensing. 
3. MANAGERIAL DISCRETION 
Another possible complication has to do not with the potential buyer's inability 
to raise the appropriate amount of capital, but with the potential licensor's 
potential inability to know even a good deal when it comes along. This 
complication can be termed managerial discretion,96 by which I mean to embrace 
all those agency problems that may make managers in complex corporations 
sometimes arrive at decisions that are less value-maximizing than they could be. I 
would include here, for example, personal risk aversion, bureaucratic structure, 
group dynamics, and laziness.97 Thus, the officials of a company that owns a 
given copyright may refuse to license simply because the requested license is in an 
unfamiliar field and their particular bureaucratic structure penalizes unlucky risk 
takers more than it rewards lucky ones. When critical, parodic, or otherwise 
controversial licenses would be at issue, the human desire to ··play it safe" might 
prevent value-maximizing transfers from occurring.98 Managerial discretion is 
just one of many agency problems that can prevent the parties from dealing with 
each other like the unitary participants in the classic Coasian transaction. 
4. PRICELESSNESS 
All of the above are reasons why socially desirable "licenses to be critical" are not 
likely to be granted if left solely to the devices of copyright owners. 99 One 
additional and probably most important factor remains to be discussed: the 
difference between the minimum price a person would accept to sell something, 
"" T.h~r: .is a fairly ex.tensive lit~rature on the controversial question of whether managerial 
disudwn exists and if so what impact it has and what should be done about it. I draw on it here 
only to make the most general point: that agency problems will often prevent value-maximizing 
chmces from occurring 
"' In an individual a tas;e fo · k 1 · · ·1· 
· · r ns or azmess might be a legitimate p·1rt of her personal uu ity 
curve. hut a manager is supposed t · · · h · · ' · 
'" 8 . o max1m1ze t e ut1hty of the corporat1011. 111 see Jenmfer Arlen Matthew s 't . d E · . . . . . , 
, . . · Pl zer an nc Talley. E11dm1me111 Effects W11h111 C orporaft 
.1ge11cr Relat1<msl11p~ 31 J Leg· 1 St d 1 (2002 · · ·· · t 
. : : · · a u · ) (Experimental evidence suggests that corpord e 
.igents may be less hkely than ord· . . . . . . . . . , 
. d ·1r mary persons to exh1b1t differences between wilhngness to pa) 
99 an w1 mgness to accept). 
Of course, such licenses might b . t d I fli Id d 
b . . . e gran e ; o er here only an ·1bstract ·unlysis th·1t wou nee to e empmcally verified. ' · ' ' · · ' 
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and the maximum amount that same person would pay if she wished to purchase 
the thing. 100 
The concept here basically refers to the fact that giving someone an entitlement 
makes that person richer, and this may change how the holder monetarily values 
both the entitlement and other resources, and this in turn may affect how 
entitlements are eventually allocated once bargaining between that person and 
other persons is completed. 101 Variations in buy and sell valuations do not retard 
resources from moving to hands where, given a particular entitlement starting-
point, the resources have their highest monetary value. But the location of that 
highest value may depend crucially on starting point. Admittedly, these variations 
do not often make a difference; in instances where fungible commodities are sold 
in markets populated by many buyers and sellers, '"buy"' and "sell" valuations 
probably tend to converge. But, when the variations do have an impact, they have 
the potential of rendering the meaning of '"highest-valued'" use indeterminate in 
the sense that the location of the highest-valued use is not independent of the law. 
In such cases, everything can depend on the legal assignment of entitlements that 
form the transaction ·s starting point. 
For example, you are unlikely to sell a privilege to inflict significant pain on 
yourself, no matter how much money another person offers for the privilege. 
Assuming you begin with such a right, you would not sell it to a sadist or a foe. By 
refusing to sell, you appear to be the highest-valued ··user" of your body, and its 
continuance in a harm-free state seems to be the highest-valued '"use" for your 
body as a resource. But consider what would happen if the entitlement were 
switched. If the law gave the sadist or foe liberty to inl1ict pain on you. he might 
refuse your monetary offers in preference to pursuing his pleasures. At that point 
the sadist or foe would appear to be the highest-valued user - and the highest-
valued use of your body would appear to be serving as a pin-cushion. 102 The 
apparent location of '"highest value" has switched. 
When things like pain and bodily integrity are at stake, therefore, the notion of 
highest-valued use is dependent on legal starting points. It would be circular to 
100 I follow Mishan hen.:. He used the term ··welfare effects" to examine the allocative impact 
brought about by a change in wealth. including the change brought about by being given. or 
being denied. an entitlement. Mishan argued that one reason for this impact can be ability to 
pay. E.J. Mishan. The Postll'ar Li1erat11re on Externalities: An /111erprelil'e Essay, 9 J. Econ. 
Literature I (1971) at 18-19. 
101 For an excellent numerical example. see id. at 18-21. It is well recognized that a divergence often 
exists between the price that a potential buyer would be willing to pay for a resource he does not 
own. and the price that the same person would demand before he would sell that same resource 
if the law had initiallv awarded its ownership to him. What is less clear is what terminology. 
explanations. and ch,;racterizations are best employed for discussing the phenomenon. for a 
valuable discussion. see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer. JVil/ingness To Pay I'S. 
Willingness to A.ccepl: Le~a/ and Economic Jmplicatiom. 71 Wash. U.L.Q. 59 (1993). 
102 See Mishan. supra note JOO at 18-19: Gordon. Tmrnrd a Jurisprndence o/'Be11efi1s. supra note 77 
at 1042-43: also see Alfred C. Yen. Restoring The Natural La11·: Copyrighl as Lahor and 
Possession. 51 Ohio St. L..I. 491. 518-519 ( 1990) ( .. flip-flop"' of rights). 
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make the search for the highest-valued use the basis for assigning initial 
entitlements to such things. As Edwin Baker has pointed out. if we tried to 
assign a right in such things .. to the party who would buy it from the other party if 
the party had the right", we could locate no such party. The answer is 
indeterminate: "neither party would buy because neither party would selr' .103 
Professor Coase showed that in a world without transaction costs, welfare 
effects or strategic behavior. resources will be traded to their highest-valued uses, 
so that. as between any two users of a resource. if A can use the resource more 
productively than B. A will end up with it. 104 Therefore, many scholars argue. in a 
real world full of transaction costs that can impede bargaining. it often makes 
sense to .. mimic the marker·tos and assign legal rights to the highest-valued user in 
the first instance. This is a core insight of Law and Economics. Yet the Law and 
Economics argument largely depends on there being a stable highest-valued user. 
The injunction to "seek efficiency by mimicking the perfect market'" only makes 
normative sense if the perfect market allocation is stable. If the allocation of rights 
significantly affects the monetary valuation that parties place on a resource. then 
there may be no stable economic reality for the law to seek to mimic. 
There is at least one salient class of goods that lack this stability. These are the 
precious. personal. irreplaceable, crucial goods one thinks of as "priceless ... 
Examples are many: the Dead Sea Scrolls; family heirlooms: one's children. health. 
reputation and peace of mind. The monetary value a person places on one of these 
goods may well depend on whether the person has a legal entitlement to it 
(whether she "owns" it) or whether she must purchase it. 
Some of the change in monetary valuation may stem from differing 
psychological attitudes people have to things that are "'theirs" versus things they 
have to purchase. Even with items as trivial as coffee mugs this endowment effect 
can be seen. (In experiments. college students were found to value mugs differently 
depending on whether the student's status was as an "owner" of the mug or as a 
.. possible purchaser". 106) But for many goods, like the coffee mugs. the effect is 
likely to be minor enough not to affect the identification of highest-valued use. to7 
101 C Ed . B k 
· ~J 'i Will .. a. er, The Ideology of" the Economic .Analysis of" Lall'. 5 Phil. & Public AfT. 3 at 12 1 "~ ( ~ 7- ). This is perh<1ps the first legal article to discuss the relevance of such effects for the law. 
10, .'iceCl~ase. The Prohlem of" Social Cost. supra note 85. 
Assummg the leg·tl nght to the p ·h Id · · · .r 
- - -' - erson w o wou purchase 1t saves society the costs of trans1cr. 
and ensures that the resource find· "t· .. h h. h · 
. s 1 sway tot e 1g est-valued user. However. there are m,my 
reasons to decline to mimic th · k t · h. · · ' 
.. , . . , . e m,1r e 111 t 1s way. For example, a low-valumg user Ill.I) 
nn crthcless be morallv entitled to pa)'ment r th · · d. ·t·1te 
. . - 1or e resource, or incentive concerns may H: ' 
106 ~nng the low-value_ user compensation for a resource he may hold. 
for further exploration and "o ·t· t. I · · · d 
, , . , . , .. : '' r ci a 10n to re evant literature. see J .J. Rachhnsky & r. Jour en. 
10' 
Runulu .i and tht Ps.1 clwlogy of 01mership. 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1541 ( 1998) and Hoffman & Spitzer. supra note IOI. 
Set' Coase. Notes m1 the Prohlem of· Sol"ia/ Cri ·t . 85 
. .1 •• 111pranote at 157.170 74. 
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The case is far different for things we think of as priceless. For them, adding to 
whatever endowment effect may exist, is the simple but immensely powerful 
constraint of a person's purchasing power. his or her ability to pay. For things of 
great value. ability to pay can interact with ownership status to yield obvious shifts 
in what appears to be the highest valued use. 108 
Consider health, for example. It is plausible that most people would be 
unwilling to sell their organs at any price, so that Jane Smith might turn down an 
offer of five million dollars from Billionaire X for one of her kidneys. Similarly, if 
Jane Smith has kidney failure and one of her dying relatives wills her a healthy 
kidney, she might well be unwilling to take the billionaire's five million dollars in 
exchange for her entitlement to it. If so, Jane Smith looks like the kidney's 
"highest-valued user." But should she have no entitlement to the kidney from the 
recently-deceased person (perhaps because the relevant jurisdiction does not 
recognize such bequests as enforceable), Jane Smith's own budget and health 
insurance will place a limit on how much she can spend pursuing the transplant. It 
is highly unlikely she will be able to outbid Billionaire X for the kidney. If so, 
Billionaire X will appear to be the '"highest-valued user." One can draw from such 
a pattern no reliable information about whether the resource has its highest value 
in the hands of the billionaire or Jane Smith. This phenomenon might be called the 
"pricelessness effect." 
The pricelessness effect is related to the phenomenon already mentioned: since 
assigning an entitlement to someone makes that person wealthier. it can affect the 
valuation the person puts on resources. For example, often "accept" and "offer" 
prices differ from each other. Many people hedge the Coase Theorem by noting it 
does not apply when significant effects of this kind are present. But usually such 
effects are so minor that they do not impair the reliability of using a market 
mimicry approach to model efficiency. 109 
The "pricelessness effect" deserves having its own name precisely because the 
subcategory of effects it denotes is likely to be significant. The '"pricelessness 
effect'' comes into play when the entitlement at issue pertains to a good that ( 1) an 
Iox ""[W]herever the welfare invoh·ed is substantial." Mishan points out. ability to pay may account 
for potent shifts in perceived value. "The maximum sum he will pay for something valuable is 
obviously related to. indeed limited by. a person's total resources. while the minimum sum he 
will accept for parting with it is subject to no such constraint." See. e.g .. Mishan. supm note 
100, at 18 19. 
1114 See Coase. /Voles 0 11 1he Prohlem o(Social Cost. supra note 85 at 170-174 (discussing arguments 
re the presumed effect of changes in legal position on the distribution of wealth and on the 
allocation of resources). 
Professor Coase argues that the impact of these effects can be overstated because, among 
other things, if the legal rules are known in advance. the prices of applicable resources will likel) 
alter in a way that 1;1inimizes such effects; in addition. he suggests. contractual provision for 
contingencies may he available to mitigate some changes in legal rules. See id. at 157. See also 
id. at 170 174. Neither of these devices is likely to eliminate the effect - here called 
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individual or group values very highly and (2), which is virtually irreplaceable, and 
(3) when it is the allocation of that very good110 which is at issue. As to such items. 
the initial placement of the entitlement is likely to have a sharp effect on the price 
and allocation of the resource. even in the absence of transaction costs. 
In cases of parody or criticism - both areas where "fair use" treatment tends to 
be awarded to defendants - reputation may be at issue. To many, reputation is 
priceless in the sense we have been discussing. For example, a novelist who fears 
that a journalist will use extensive quotations from her book to bolster a hostile 
review will be most unlikely to sell the journalist a license to copy those quotations 
- regardless of the price offered. But that does not mean the author's preference is 
the "highest-valued use" in any meaningful sense. since that same author may be 
unable to buy silence if the law gives the journalist a "fair use" liberty right to 
publish. A similar analysis can be made of parody: since most people intensely 
dislike being ridiculed. the legal right may determine where the highest-valued use 
lies. 111 In such cases, the market is useless as a guide. and formal deference to 
owners' market powers is inappropriate. 
For example. assume A is a novelist, a copyright owner who has an entitlement 
not to license and who is otherwise financially comfortable: she has perhaps $4,000 
in the bank. a two-year old car and a prospect of steady royalties. She may be 
tempted by B's offer of. say. $10,000 for a license to use her work, but she can 
afford to say no without altering her lifestyle. If B's project is an ordinary 
commercial project and A will not be sacrificing more than $10,000 from foregoing 
alternative uses of the work. she will probably license. (It might also happen that 
B's project would not require an exclusive license and would not otherwise 
interfere with A's other licensing opportunities. If so, granting B permission to go 
forward would have no opportunity cost at all for A. She would be even more 
likely to license such a use.) However. if B's project is hostile toward A's work as a 
whole. A may well refuse the license. either to protect her long-term economic 
interest (which may be a mere pecuniary loss, remember). her aesthetic reputation. 
or her feelings. 
If however the law gave novelist A no entitlement to prevent B's use. then she 
would h_ave to persuade B not to publish (cf., "paying for silence." as in 
blackmail). The most A could offer B to persuade B not to make the critical use 
planned is the amount in her bank account, plus whatever she could sell her car 
for. plus whatever she could borrow on the strength of her expected royalty 
110 That is. while I predict th t th l· ,·. . · · . - · · 
. . a e a\\ s assignment of rights m organs or tree speech 1s likely to 
have a d1stmct effect on the all t. f k'd · · - · 
• . oca 10n o 1 neys or speech. 1t 1s a more complex question 
whether the law s as - f · h · · · 1· 
signment o ng ts m organs will have much of an effect on the allocat1on o 
otlier resources. 
111 These points are also ex lor d · G . . . .. . 
1041-4]· . 1 .. P, e m ordon. To\\ ard a J11nspnulence of Bene/tis. supra note 7~ ,1t 
": -- a so see Fau use as Market Failure. s11nra note ., ·1t I (111 1f1 (·11111'-disseminatwn 
mol!ves). r -· ' - - - ' 
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stream. The total may well be Jess than $10.000, and B will probably demand a 
price in excess of$ 10,000. Give A the entitlement and the highest-valued use of the 
contested expression is in her hands; give B the entitlement and the highest-valued 
use is in that licensee's hands. The locus of the "highest-valued use" has shifted as 
a result of where the law places its entitlement. In such cases, looking to the results 
of consensual transactions will not give us any information about who "should" 
have the right. 
Another way to put the point is this: 112 Economics is sometimes used as a 
normative guide for good social policy. When it is used in this fashion, its primary 
claim to legitimacy stems from the links between economics and utilitarianism. 11 -' 
The more that income distribution restricts the expression of individuals' 
preferences. the shakier the link between economics and utility becomes. This 
linkage has the potential for completely breaking down in cases of "pricelessness." 
Though in such cases the parties' preferences may remain constant. both in their 
objects and in their intensity, a shift in who owns the entitlement may effectively 
disable one of those parties from effectuating that preference. Thus a legal regime 
that is committed (even in part) to utilitarian consequentialism would be unwise to 
rely upon a money-bound market model for normative guidance in cases of 
pricelessness. 
In sum, refusing to allow a copyright owner to suppress a hostile use of the 
copyrighted work. in a case where the "'pricelessness effect" is likely to make a 
determinative difference. does not necessarily contravene economic principles. In 
such an instance, it is appropriate for even an economically oriented court to 
refuse to defer to the copyright owner. and instead make an independent weighing 
of how enforcing the copyright in the given instance would affect welfare. and any 
other relevant consequentialist or nonconsequentialist policies. 
Reconsidering the "substantial injury" hurdle to fair use 
In Fair Use as Market Failure. I argued that fair use was and should be granted 
only if a three-part test were satisfied: that (I) defendant could not appropriately 
purchase the desired use through the market; (2) transferring control over the use 
to defendant would serve the public interest; and (3) the copyright owner's 
112 I am indebted here to Alan Feld. 
i 1.i This belief is rather controversial. See. e.g .. such classic sources on the debate as the Sr111posiw11 
on Eflicirncr as a Le~al Concem. 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 485 (1980) and Richard A. Posner. THE 
ECONOMiCS OF JliSTlCE 48 115 (Harvard l.Jniversity Press 1981) for further discussion of 
the question of whether utilitarianism and economics arc truly linked in this way. 
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incentives would not be substantially impaired by allowing the user to proceed. 114 
This current article is consistent with the first two prongs, but I would like to 
reconsider the third prong, the substantial injury hurdle, under which substantial 
injury to the plaintiffs incentives should ordinarily bar fair use. 
As Neil Netanel has pointed out, the third prong of the test effectively forces all 
inquiries to be subordinated to the economic. 115 Yet there are instances where 
noneconomic values will be more important - a possibility for which the substantial 
injury hurdle leaves no scope. Since the whole point of singling out .. justifications" 
is to help us see the occasions on which judges give fair use because economic value 
is not the proper metric, the excuse/justification distinction helped me understand 
that substantial injury to the plaintiff need not preclude fair use in all cases. In cases 
of "justification", we sometimes tolerate such injury in pursuit of other goals. 
What happens to fair use when transaction costs decrease 
In cases where fair use is premised on high transaction costs between owner and 
user. as arguably occurred in the Williams and Wilkins and perhaps even in the 
l'11il'ersal City Studios cases, 116 the precedent is vulnerable to shifts in the 
institutional and transactional landscape: If changes occur that lower the 
transaction costs (whether through collecting societies, technological devices, or 
114 f' . i· I '· 
11 , C/11' sc as. lar,,;et Failure. supra note 2. 
Ne.land . .l'llf'l'll note 6 at 330-331. (Thanks to Tom McNulty for this formulation of Netanel's 
pomt.) 
11
" Th 1· II . · 
. ~ 0 owmg chart depicts the results in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S .. 203 Ct. Cl. 74 ( 1973 ! . 
afl d hr 1111 <'<fllally divided co111·1. 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam) and Sonv Corp. of America v. 
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otherwise), the increased ease in transacting should and does result in a lessened 
availability of the fair use defense. 117 This is appropriate. as 1 recognized in my 
original piece. 118 If fair use was granted because market conditions made it hard to 
consult the owner. but a market remained desirable. then there is every reason to 
return to relying on the market when owner and user are put in a position where 
they can consult. Relying on the market means fully enforcing the copyright. 
In short, in many cases of "'excuse" it will be possible for the facts to alter in a 
way that eliminates the desirability of fair use treatment. But the same is not true 
of cases of justification. for it is hard to see any factual change that could 
transform a decision governed by non-economic norms into something the market 
could adequately handle.11 9 
Although market malfunctions can be curable, it is important to avoid 
exaggerating the extent to which even "'excuse" cases will disappear. Consider the 
promise that the Internet and collecting societies may offer for lowering transaction 
costs. Much argument has centered on whether transaction costs will in fact grow 
low enough to allow markets to form between copyright owners and at-home 
occasional users, and what the impact will be on fair use. 120 But for all the debate, it 
117 See. e.g., three cases in which the availability of potential licensing helped persuade the courts 
against fair use: American Geophysical Union v. Texaco. 60 F.3d 913. 923 (2d Cir. 1994): 
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services. Inc .. 99 F 3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996): 
Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks. 542 F.Supp. 1156. 1173 78 (W.D.N.Y. 
1982). A graph for them would look as follows: 
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The Britannica case is discussed in Fair Cse as .\larker Failure. mpra note 2 at 1629. For 
commentaries on how cases like Texaco may affect my .'vfarket Failure analysis. see. e.g .. 
Edmund W Kitch. Can the Internet Shrink Fair L'.1e?. 78 Neb.L.Rev. 880 (1999): Tom W. Bell. 
Fair Use i·s. Fared Use: The Impact of Awomated Rights Management on Copyright "s Fair t:.~e 
Doctrine. 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557 (1998): Loren. Redefining The Marker Failure Approach To Fair 
Use In An Era Of Copyright Permission Systems. supra note 2: Merges. The End of Friction:'. 
supra note 2. 
11
" Fair Use as Market Failure. supra note 2. at 1629 & note 159 and 1645-57. 
119 See Michael Walzer. SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY (Basic Books 1983). He argues that to maintain some equality. it is necessary that 
some goods (e.g .. political office) remain unavailable for purchase by money. By contrast. the 
instant article stresses relations rather than things. 
As Margaret Jane Radin has pointed out. see Justice and the Jfarket Domain. supra note 40. 
most of our life involves a mix of market and nonmarket relations. even in connection with the 
same objects 
120 See. e.g .. Beli. supra note 117: Edmund W. Kitch. Can the Internet Shrink Fair Use'.'. 78 Neb. L. 
Rev. 880 ( 1999): Loren. supra note 2. 
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must be stressed most cases of fair use are premised on factors other than 
transaction-cost barriers that keep copyright owner and potential licensee apart, and 
some of these other factors can be relevant to home copying. For example. a judicial 
and legislative unwillingness to impose copyright liability on individual at-home 
. d . . 1~1 users has other. converging explanations, such as the esire to preserve pnvacy -
and maintain a feeling of community. 122 These concerns will not disappear in the 
face of a reduction in transaction costs. Thus, many cases of excuse contain facts 
that are inextricably intertwined with non-economic normative judgments. 
The latter point can be seen by considering the "external benefit" generated by 
a historian, critic or scholar who reproduces someone's words or images. In 
analyzing the case, we can move back and forth between the market and non-
market normative realms. Let us focus on a scholar like the defendant in Time v. 
Geis who needs to copy some copyrighted text or image to convey his point. One 
way to look at the scholar's quandary is through the lens of justification: that he is 
furthering public debate in a way that is not monetizable. However, one could also 
see his position through the lens of excuse - that even if the benefits the scholar 
generates are capable of being put into monetary terms, the scholar's pocketbook 
is unlikely to reflect much of that benefit. Those benefits will remain extemal to 
him. so he will be unlikely to offer a license fee high enough to reflect the social 
benefit at issue. Conceivably the scholar's book could earn a million-dollar 
advance, which would "cure" the externality problem. But in reality, scholarly 
books rarely ever internalize much of the social benefit they generate, so that this 
kind of fair use is likely to be durable despite factual changes. The benefit given to 
the public by the historian. critic or scholar is unlikely ever to be reflected in his or 
her pocket. 123 And even if the historian, critic or scholar who quotes from a 
copyrighted work did capture a significant amount of the benefit she generates. a 
normative economist might still suggest exempting her from having to obtain 
permission from her target: Judge Posner has suggested that, "The social product 
is diminished if persons are able to exact compensation from truthful critics of 
their failings. for such a right reduces the incentive to produce truth." 124 One 
121 St-e. e.g .. Jessica Utman., Reforming li!f'ormation Lall' In Copyright's Image, 22 Dayton L.Rev. 
587 (l 997) (d1scussmg privacy concerns). 
122 Maintaining gift relationships can be particularly important to maintaining artistic community 
and Y1hrancy. See Lewis Hyde. THE GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF 
1, 1 ~ROPERTY 47. 272-82 (Vintage Books 1983). 
- See Fa 11· Use as Markel Failure, supra note 2 at I 607, 1630-3 I ("In cases of externalities. then. 
the potential user ma)·· wish to prod ·. 11 · · · f th 
. . . uce soc1a y mentonous new works hy usmg some o e 
copyright owner s material vet b u · bl t h · · 
· . . . · , e na e o pure ase perm1ss10n because the market structure 
prevents him lrom bemg able to capitalize on the benefits to be realized.·· /d. at 1631 ). Also see 
Loren. supra note 2. 
124 Richard A. Posner. J.Vhen Is Parody Fair Use, 21 J. Legal Stud. 67 at 74 ( 1992). In the quoted 
passage. Judge Posner seems to b · · H · · h , 
l . b e mixmg norms. e seems to view truth as sornethmg w ose va ue 1s a solute. rather than a th' h · · · b 
I h s some mg w ose value 1s dependent on market prelen;nces. ut t 1cn e seems to use a purel)' econom· d I f · · . . · · · Id 
IC mo e or its production. This 1s mtngumg. Rcal-wor 
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might add that the availability of receiving compensation from critics could also 
decrease the ordinary disincentives to produce flawed work. 
For all these reasons, even market malfunction is not always curable. Many 
externalities will be unaffected by technological and institutional change. Further. 
many '"excuse" cases are intertwined with issues of justification. 
A possible danger of my approach 
In copyright law, judges have developed a complex. largely unarticulated network 
of defenses under the rubric of ··fair use." 125 This article suggests that. paralleling 
the common law distinction. some fair use cases involve "excuse" and some 
involve "justification". Because changes in circumstances are relevant to "excuse·· 
in a way they are not to "justification". the distinction between the categories is 
particularly important for areas of law like copyright that involve rapid 
technological and institutional change. Some recent confusion may result from 
conflating cases of excuse and justification together. 126 
My analysis is not impaired by the fact that courts do not explicitly distinguish 
between justified and excused fair uses. What the common law judges 
accomplished over several centuries, copyright judges have had to develop over 
a much shorter time. It is no wonder that the separately delineated defenses of the 
common law are collapsed together in the copyright area. where the time to 
elaborate and distinguish the defenses has been so condensed. 
The main problem with the analysis that I offer is that it leaves a myriad of 
decision points open for judges to resolve. Look at all the decisions that are open, 
and must be made by someone: 
C0/11. 
policymakers do indeed regularly choose "goods" by means of nonmarket criteria, and then 
turn to pragmatic tools. including the economic. in order to secure the production of the good. 
Possibly Judge Posner is responding to the fact that "perfec.:t information" (truth) is one of 
the pre-conditions for a perfect market. James Boyle has suggested that markets for information 
cannot be well addressed through a neoclassical lens since that lens presupposes an abundant 
supply of information whose scarcity is in fact something that needs to be remedied. James 
Boyle. SHAMANS. SOFTWARE. AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (Harvard UniYersity Press 1996). While I do not share 
Boyle's pessimism about the uselessness of economics here after all. no system can be 
Yalidated by terms entirely within itself he is right to emphasize that for a market. information 
has the dual role of precondition and product. 
1
"' In copyright law. a defendant is liable if her work is "substantially similar" to. and copied from. 
the plaintiffs copyrighted work. A finding that "substantial similarity" is lacking constitutes 
, another place where doctrine hides a complex network of defenses and limitations. 
1-6 Thus. persons who believe that a decrease in transaction costs can eliminate fair use treatment 
may be seeing everything in terms of a narrowly-defined ··excuse" type market malfunction. and 
ignoring the possibilities of justified fair use. 
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Someone (probably a judge, but "fair use 1s usually considered a mixed 
question of law and fact) has to decide whether a defendant's use implicates only 
monetary values. Even if it is decided that the use implements solely monetary 
values, the Someone then has to decide whether or not the market can implement 
those values. If it is decided that the market suffices to achieve value 
maximization, then the plaintiffs right is enforced. If market norms are applicable 
but the particular market cannot be relied on. then the Someone has to decide 
whether the defendant's behavior is socially desirable on an economic metric. and, 
employing the same metric, whether it is appropriate that the plaintifrs consent 
was not sought and whether the defendant should pay compensation. 
Conversely, the Someone may decide that the defendant's use does not 
implicate only monetary values. If so, then that Someone needs to address the 
values that are involved, and do so in relation to the three questions of behavior. 
permission and compensation. 
The analysis makes clear - perhaps too clear - how many normative decisions 
the law of "fair use" requires. But the current doctrinal formulations for fair use 
involve no fewer normative choices - the choices are merely better hidden. 
I do not think that requiring explicit normative choice means leading judges 
into a realm of pure judicial legislation. Rather. it leads them into a field of subtle 
cues that a judge can employ to navigate.127 Nevertheless. it can be objected that 
such openness leaves the law too vulnerable to particular judges' idiosyncrasies. I 
know of no better preventative than to try to classifv and define the choices 
involved, and the taxonomy of this article is intended as,~ contribution to that end. 
Lawyers have known, at least since the Legal Realists and probably since law 
~egan, that the neutrality of the law is only partial. and that normative choice 
mflue~ces virtually all hard decisions. Is it more useful to explicitly name and 
orga?i~e those value choices, or is it better to promote law's perceived legitimacy 
by hidmg them? That is, alas, an open question of its own. I suggest that much 
good can come from exposing the pluralism of our norms. even if that means the 
~op~lace then loses its illusion that the law operates like a machine. Any narrower 
'.nquuy could i~pose great harm on nonmarket values. particularly free speech, 
and that would impose an even greater cost. 
Post Script_: thoughts on the issue of full fair use versus 
compensation 
When a judge faces a ( · · · , h h· · 
air use mquuy, she knows after ArnffRo.w 1- 8 that s e cts 
127 ~~eSl~·l IC(~~~~s) Fried, Sc/10/urs and J11dgl'.1'.· Rra.wm and 1'1111·..,.. 2.~ llarv .. 1.L.. & Puh. Pol"y 807 
12X ' " 
See note 33 and accompanying text . . 
. . 1up1a. 
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several options in regard to remedy. She can refuse an injunction (because she 
finds the defendant's use socially desirable and finds the neglect of the owner's 
veto power excusable or justifiable). but she is nevertheless free to give the plaintiff 
a reasonable royalty or other compensation. This is equivalent to the judge 
·'making a market": the judge can decrease transaction costs by creating new 
points of contact between the parties. It can also be seen as a judicially imposed 
compulsory license. 
Traditionally. judges in fair use cases faced a binary choice: either find fair use 
and give the plaintiff no remedy at all, or find infringement and give the plaintiff 
both injunctive and monetary relief. Now that their discretion is explicitly 
enlarged. should judges in fair use cases routinely give compensation to the 
plaintiff? Should they ever do so? A .. compensation-only" or .. liability rule" 
approach has the virtue of apparent compromise: it appears to encourage 
dissemination and discourse, while simultaneously preserving incentives. 
The liability-rule approach is so attractive. that we may ask whether all 
copyright cases should be open to this route. In doing so, we must be wary of a 
likely corollary: if injunctions disappear in favor of monetary rewards. the scope of 
copyright is likely to expand. Congress has already been remarkably generous to 
the .. copyright industries" (entertainment. media. and so on) at the expense of the 
public domain. 129 The demise of injunctions would let industry lobbyists more 
easily argue in favor of even greater copyright extensions. If so, much that is 
currently free will come to bear a price tag. ls this bad'? 
Of the many lessons the commodification literature has to teach copyright 
lawyers and theorists. let me single out two strands relevant to this issue. First. 
Titmuss in his classic and controversial work. The Gifi Relationship.1.'o suggested 
that for some products, quality degrades when they are commodilied. His focus 
was on the market for human blood. 
His research suggested that switching from a donor system to a sale system 
degraded the quality of the blood available for transfusions. People who sell blood 
are both likely to have questionable health histories (drug use corresponds with 
poverty) and a reason to lie about that health history. By contrast. people who 
donate blood are more likely to be healthy, and have fewer motives to lie. 
Second. Titmuss and others have shown that over-commodification can have 
deleterious systemic effects. Thus. if a large proportion of blood begins to come 
from monetary purchase, the sheen of donative merit that now attaches to voluntary 
blood donation may diminish. Anything having to do with transfers of blood may 
begin to acquire an unsavory reputation. and voluntary donations may slow. 
129 SC'e Jessica D. Litman. Copyright. Compromise. and LC'gislatir<' History. 72 Cornell l. Rev. 857. 
, 870-79 (1987); Pamela Samuelson. Th<' Coprright Grah. 4.01 Wired 135 (1996) 
1.o Richard M. Titmuss. THE GffT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL 
POLICY (Random House 1972). Whether or not Titmuss was correct as an empirical matter. 
the question of product quality is well raised by him. 
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For a more dramatic example of deleterious systemic effect. consider the 
following, drawn in part from a hefty science-fiction literature on commodifica-
tion. If human organs could be freely bought and sold. persons might imperil their 
health in the efforts to help their families economically: people might make 
irreversible choices they come to regret because they may be unable to predict the 
way their preferences might be affected by selling parts of themselves: murders 
might increase as organ-nappers went into the chop-shop business. Even the state 
might increase the scope of crimes deemed worthy of capital punishment. 131 
Given the great attraction that the "no injunction/money only" remedy holds 
for copyright, we should consider some of its dangers. What kind of quality 
degradation or deleterious systemic effects could eventuate if liability-rule 
judgments of "'compensation only" drastically increased? Let us look at an 
extreme: assume that fair use as free use disappears. that copyright expands. and 
that most of the public's current rights to "'copy and to use" 1.12 have become 
conditional on payment. 
Theresa Amabile and other social psychologists have determined that in some 
contexts. external motivation in the form of rewards can decrease the quality of 
creative work. Emphasizing monetary relief could conceivably have this effect. 
Injunctive relief is a "natural" outgrowth of an author·s creating a work: with 
creation comes an instinct for control. If instead an author could only expect 
money. her perception of her task - and the quality of what she produces - could 
degrade. 133 
What of systemic effects? Imagine that technology increased to such an extent 
that all uses we made of each other's works would automatically trigger a change 
in our bank balances. and that copyright law had evolved to require payment on 
all such occasions. If I quote you - even a quote that would have been fair use to a 
prior generation - a nickel or a dollar flows from my account to yours. If I quote 
from a book written long ago - even a book that would have been in the public 
domain had there been no series of laws extending the copyright term - a nickel or 
1J I I 
n the future soc~ety of one science fiction story. a series of traffic violations was enough cause 
t~ senten~e the v10lator to death, .making his body available to the governmental organ hanks. 
Larry Niven. The Jigsaw Man m DANGEROUS VISIONS 218 229 (Harlan Ellison ed .. 
Berkley Books. 1983). Consider also the recent revelations concerning China's use of executed 
pnsoners. Craig G. Smith. On Death Row, Chino's Source of' Tra11spfa11ts. N. Y. TIMES 
(October 18. 2001) (Thank t D· ·d K h r · · · · · · ) JJ~ Th . . · s 0 avi o 1or brmgmg this matenal lo mv allcnllon . 
16; f1~:;~ ts Jusllce O'Connor's. Bonito Boats, Inc.~. Thunder Craft Boats: Inc .. 489 U.S. 141. 
JJ' Admittedlv, the ex er· . · . . . -
I . · . P tments of Amabile and her colleague ·ire too hm1tcd lo allo\\ !Inn cone us10ns parllcularly re d. d I · • · R · · Con · E:' . . gar mg a u t arl!sls. Teresa M. Amahile. Mary Ann Collins. eg11J.1 PSY~Hot~GPh1lhps. CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT: UPDATE TO THE soCI~L 
. 1. . y OF CREATIVITY (Westv1ew Press 1996) al 171 177. Further. my argument 
app 1es to works that are owned b th · . . · t. in k c h. Y etr creators. For the large numhcrs 111 works wnl ~n 
woNr orh 11re contexts, monetization has lo some extent alrcadv occurred. 
evert e ess ll 1s clear that · · ht t , · h · / 
ev t ·d h. a ng 0 control can have efli:cts diffcn:nt from a nght to e pau · 
en ou s1 e t e realm of creativity S R hi. 
- · ee ac insky and Jourdcn. supra note I 06. 
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dollar flows from my account to the account of the authors' heirs. This is quite 
different from what happens today. But if in fact I have experienced monetary 
benefit in the amount of that nickel or dollar, would it not be safe to make me pay? 
After all, in such a case requiring payment will not impose a net harm. Yet even if 
the recipient is ordered to pay only a portion of the monetary benefit he or she has 
earned. some danger remains. 
My space here is obviously too short to explore all the difficulties that might 
result with a regime where we pay for all the monetary benefits we receive from 
others. One salient danger is that a requirement of ubiquitous payment may erode 
everyone's sense of indebtedness to the community. In the literature on what 
motivates political morality .'34 the perception of reciprocity is key. 135 One reason 
we pay taxes without a policeman breathing down our shirts is that we see benefits 
the government gives us. and gives to others who in turn may benefit us. Our legal 
system would fall apart if we only paid taxes, and obeyed other laws, when a 
policeman looks over our shoulder. A pervasive system where we pay for each bit 
of what we use could give us the illusion that we are not net recipients. (I say 
'"illusion", for only the labor and insights of generations has protected us from 
lives nasty. brutish and short. There is no way we can pay everyone we owe.) From 
this illusion that we have paid for everything we have, could come an unwillingness 
to give back to the community and an unwillingness to obey its laws. 
Conclusion 
In this essay. I have emphasized that sometimes our social goals aim at something 
other than '"the maximization of value as measured by willingness to pay". On 
such occasions where the market shows its inherent limitations, it may be 
justifiable for a copyist not to ask permission from a copyright owner. It may still 
happen that a judge decides that the copyist should be considered an infringer. but 
the decision will be based on something other than a mere failure to obtain the 
copyright owner's consent. 
I have also suggested that sometimes our social goals do indeed aim at .. the 
maximization of economic value as measured by willingness to pay." On those 
occasions, the market is a presumptively useful way to proceed. However. 
sometimes the market cannot be relied upon to direct a resource to its highest-
valued use because the conditions for perfect competition are absent. When a real-
134 The phrase is Goodin's. Rohert E. Goodin. MOTIVATING POLITICAL MORALITY 
(Blackwell Puhlishers 1992). 
135 Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collatil'e Action, And Lmr. in Symposium on Trust Relationships Part 1 
of2.81 B.U. L.Rev. 333(2001) 
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world market fails in this way to attain the conditions of a perfect market. we have 
market malfunction. In such cases, a copyist may be excused for not having sought 
a copyright owner's permission. It may still happen that a judge will decide that 
the copyist should be considered an infringer, but the decision should, again. be 
based on something more than a mere failure to obtain the copyright owner's 
consent. 
Loosely, one can associate market malfunctions such as high transaction costs 
with "excuse", and inherent market limitations - where other. non-market norms 
should govern - with notions of "justification". ··Excuse" fits those cases where 
economics appropriately governs, for there we would prefer the defendant to ask 
permission and pay if only circumstances did not make it inadvisable. By contrast, 
when alternative norms govern ("market limitation"), we may affirmatively want 
the defendant not to ask permission or not to pay. In such cases. failure of payment 
or permission is something we may want emulated. and if so, it is "justified". 
In cases of both excuse and justification, it may be advisable to order 
compensation even if an injunction is denied. However, I have suggested one of 
several possible dangers in this tempting approach: That with the demise of the 
injunction we are likely to see an expansion in the scope of copyright, and as a 
result we may drift into a cash-and-carry mode of social interaction that could be 
destructive of creativity, community and respect for Jaw. 
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